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Abstract 
The negative demographic trends that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
continue to create uncertainty about Russia’s future have pushed the Russian state towards 
more direct involvement in the promotion of healthy lifestyle practices with the aim of 
increasing the population’s longevity and well-being. These efforts have intensified over the 
past decade as the state has begun to more actively intervene into the bodily habits of 
Russian citizens on many other fronts, including reproductive behavior and sexual 
orientation, in order to craft the “ideal” Russian subject and establish the boundaries of 
“normal” Russian behavior. Meanwhile, other actors throughout society, motivated by their 
own ideas about what constitutes proper conduct, have been developing alternative strategies 
to encourage Russians to pursue healthy lifestyles. This thesis examines the content of the 
official healthy lifestyle promotion strategy, deconstructing how it envisions the ideal 
Russian body and frames the necessity of leading a healthy lifestyle. It also analyzes some of 
the strategies that contest the official one, with the aim of finding out which aspects are 
contested and how, as well as discerning the common discursive threads that run through all 
of the strategies. The study draws on a broad base of materials, from official policy 
documents to social media communities, and seeks to understand how various actors 
throughout Russian society attempt to transform the bodily conduct of their fellow citizens. 
In doing so, it relies heavily on the insights of Michel Foucault and others about power, 
biopolitics, discipline, and resistance, which allow for a nuanced understanding of how 
official discourses about the body and the nation in Russia are contested and how they are 
reproduced. The analysis revealed the prevalence of several themes across all of the 
strategies, including the ruinous impact of non-Russian values, the corrupting effects of 
capitalism and consumerism, the hostility of the outside world towards Russia, the glory of 
Russia’s past, and the importance of maintaining traditional gender roles.  
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1. Introduction 
Since before the election of President Vladimir Putin, the Russian state has sought to craft a 
broad ideological consensus that would serve to unify Russian citizens around the country’s 
ruling party. The tumultuous events of the early 90s, including Boris Yeltsin’s violent 
conflict with the Russian parliament and the hardships wrought by the transition away from 
a command economy, set the stage for what Laruelle (2009, p. 10) calls “patriotic centrism”: 
the state’s establishment of a “hegemony over the spectrum of political belonging which 
places the unity of the nation, and therefore the unity of its political representation, under the 
unique banner of the presidential party.” Meanwhile, the state remains as vague as possible 
on substantial ideological questions, as the formulation of a clear doctrine might risk 
“undermining the reconciliatory dynamic embodied by the presidential apparatus” (ibid., p. 
136).  
The Bolotnaya Square protests that broke out in 2011 reminded the Russian 
authorities of the urgency of reinforcing their ownership over the nation’s unity. This 
consensus has been grounded, for example, in Soviet nostalgia, the promotion of so-called 
traditional Russian values, and the idea of Russia’s organic multiculturalism as opposed to 
the false multiculturalism of Europe (Morozov 2015, p. 125). In 2012, Putin declared that 
Russia was facing “a clear deficit of spiritual bonds [dukhovnye skrepy]”, which he defined 
as “that which has from time immemorial made us stronger and more resilient.” He called on 
his fellow citizens to “support the institutions that promote traditional values,” to take heed 
of the fact that “Russia developed as a multinational state [...] a state-civilization bound 
together by the Russian people, the Russian language and the Russian culture,” and to 
remember that “regardless of our ethnic backgrounds, we have always been and will 
continue to be a united people.” He spoke of the necessity of using the spheres of education, 
culture and youth politics as “spaces for the production of the moral and well-balanced 
individual and the responsible citizen of the Russian Federation” (Putin 2012).  
Meanwhile, during his third term, the Russian state began to more actively embrace 
what Michel Foucault calls biopolitics as a means of “producing” such ideal Russian citizens 
(Makarychev & Medvedev 2015). According to Foucault, biopolitics “wields its power over 
living beings as living beings”; it is characterized by the government of the people “not by 
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law but by [...] intervention in the behaviour of individuals” with the objective of 
“foster[ing] the citizens’ life and the state’s strength” (Foucault 1988, pp. 159-160). 
Biopolitical practices are not exercised exclusively within Russia, nor do they represent a 
new form of government. Foucault traces the origin of biopolitics to 18th-century western 
Europe, positing that the emergence of this mode of governing people was characterized by 
an increasing interest of states in managing, optimizing, and producing knowledge about 
human lives, rather than simply disposing of them at will, in order to bolster the state’s 
strength (Foucault 1978, pp. 135-137). Biopolitics did not replace the more violent and 
coercive forms of rule, but rather “[recast] them within this concern for the population and 
its optimization (in terms of wealth, health, happiness, prosperity, efficiency)” (Dean 2010, 
p. 30). Biopolitics operates through what Foucault calls “biopower,” a form of power which 
is located “at every level of the social body and utilized by very diverse institutions” 
(Foucault 1978, p. 141). Biopower in Putin’s Russia has taken on many different forms and 
has been exercised by many different actors in Russian society. Makarychev and Medvedev 
(2015) describe how many legislative initiatives and social programs undertaken during 
Putin’s third term — e.g., the “gay propaganda” law, the ban on the adoption of Russian 
children into American families, and the various attempts to regulate reproductive behavior 
and promote childbirth — have implicitly or explicitly biopolitical components. As Foucault 
prescribed, these regulatory functions have been taken up by entities not located within the 
state structure itself; for example, Cossack brigades and the Orthodox Church.  
These developments have been described as “biopolitical conservatism” and aim to 
bolster support for the state by promoting a rejection of tolerant “Western” values and bodily 
practices (Makarychev & Yatsyk 2015). Putin’s biopolitical conservatism seeks to enforce a 
certain idea of the “correct” Russian citizen; its aim is to define the bounds of Russia’s 
“organic community” and to securitize those who fall outside these bounds (Morozov 2015, 
p. 193). In securitizing the bodies of Russian homosexuals, for example, the Russian 
authorities lay claim to Russia’s status as the “true Europe,” in opposition to the decadent 
and morally corrupt “false Europe” that lies to the West (ibid.). To use Foucault’s 
terminology, the biopolitical measures which have been enacted by the Russian state seek to 
produce “docile” Russian bodies which can be “subjected, used, transformed, and improved” 
(Foucault 1995, p. 180). Gaufman (2017) uses the Foucauldian concept of “pastoral power” 
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to discuss the Russian state and the networks through which it exercises biopower in terms 
of a “pastor” that intervenes in the lives of each member of the Russian “flock.”  
The applicability of Foucauldian concepts such as biopolitics/biopower to Russia and 
to non-Western contexts in general has been challenged by writers such as Said (1988), 
Plamper (2002), and Engelstein (1993), who problematize Foucault’s supposed 
Eurocentrism and assert that the processes he traced in his work developed over a specific 
territory and are too closely bound up with the emergence of capitalism and liberal 
democracy. Kangas (2015, p. 485) convincingly attributes such charges to what Agnew 
described as a “territorial trap”: the tendency of IR scholars “to try to pin [...] systemic or 
societal processes down to immutable spatial frameworks, mostly territorial states.” This 
tendency, Kangas argues, obscures the continuities between liberal and illiberal/authoritarian 
modes of government and reproduces the idea of Russia as a “self-enclosed world” not 
subject to external analysis (ibid.). Thus, the point of departure for this study is that the 
Foucauldian perspective has opened up an interesting avenue of research on the nature of 
power in modern-day Russia. However, I argue that the existing literature focuses on 
biopower as primarily a punitive mechanism wielded by the Russian state and has thus 
neglected to bring on board the full arsenal of Foucault’s ideas about power and how it 
functions. 
Firstly, I argue that the literature on biopolitics in Russia has not yet provided a 
sufficient investigation of non-punitive forms of biopower. Central to Foucault’s 
understanding of power is that it does not merely punish and discipline using physical 
coercion; it is not merely a “lawgiver that forbids and represses,” but it also “comprises the 
intention to teach, to mold conduct, to instill forms of self-awareness and identities” 
(Faubion 2000, xix). Makarychev and Medvedev (2015), as well as Makarychev and Yatsyk 
(2015) acknowledge the role of biopower in renegotiating the borders of the Russian 
political community and enforcing certain forms of conduct. They focus primarily on actions 
by the Russian state that have an explicitly restrictive or punitive component, such as its 
anti-LGBT policies, the imprisonment of Pussy Riot, and the American adoption ban. 
Certainly, power can punish and coerce while also producing or stabilizing identities. 
However, I am interested primarily in the forms of biopower that work not by imposing 
material sanctions or instilling a fear of reprisal, but by producing in individuals a desire to 
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transform themselves in order to conform to certain ideals or norms. In other words, it could 
be fruitful to study how biopolitical practices can induce individuals to “voluntarily control 
themselves by self-imposing conformity to cultural norms through self-surveillance and self-
disciplinary practices” (Pylypa 1998, p. 212). How do biopolitical discourses emanating 
from the state produce the desire to become the moral, well-balanced and responsible 
citizens Putin spoke of in 2012? 
In addition, while taking into account Foucault’s insight that power is dispersed 
throughout society, the literature does not give due attention to competing biopolitical 
discourses emanating from within Russian society. The concepts of “government,” 
“conduct,” and “counter-conduct,” introduced by Foucault and developed more fully by 
authors such as Dean (2001) and Death (2010), are useful in understanding the diverse and 
subtle ways in which hegemonic discourses can be challenged. Government is not just a 
political entity or system but “any attempt to shape [...] aspects of our behaviour according 
to particular sets of norms and for a variety of ends” (Dean 1999, p. 18). Foucault also 
described government as “the conduct of conduct” (Foucault 2009, p. 389), where the first 
instance of “conduct” refers to the way people seek to shape the behavior of others and the 
second refers to the ways that people conduct themselves. However, Foucault stressed that to 
govern is to “structure the possible field of action of others” (Foucault 1982, p. 790, 
emphasis mine), which means that there is always the possibility for resistance to the 
dominant mode of conduct. Any attempt to govern the behavior of others will inevitably 
result in the appearance of “counter-conducts,” movements or currents within society 
“whose objective is a different form of conduct” (Foucault 2009, pp. 194-195). Such 
movements may seek “to be conducted [...] by other leaders, towards other objectives and 
forms of salvation, and through other procedures and methods” than the ones prescribed by 
the hegemonic models of conduct.  
However, while they seek to be governed differently, these counter-conducts do not 
necessarily entirely reject the authority of the governors, so counter-conduct is not 
synonymous with words like “dissent” or “opposition.” Moreover, all conduct strategies are 
intermeshing and composed of a “multiplicity of discursive elements” (Foucault 1978, p. 
100), so even oppositional counter-conducts may reproduce elements of the hegemonic 
discourse and thereby reinforce existing power relations. Occasionally, the hegemonic form 
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of government might transform itself in response to counter-conducts, incorporating and 
recoding elements of the latter. All strategies for conduct envision an ideal subject, prescribe 
different practices and forms of conduct for producing this subject, and have different ways 
of framing the necessity of their conduct. Returning to the previous discussion, I believe that 
the literature on biopolitics in Russia could be enriched by a fuller analysis of different 
“biopolitical counter-conducts” within Russian society, what kinds of Russian identity they 
presuppose, and how they overlap with each other and with the dominant strategy.  
Therefore, this study will analyze the strategies used to promote healthy lifestyle 
practices in Russia, focusing specifically on how physical fitness and abstinence from 
smoking, alcohol consumption, and drug use are promoted and what discourses frame the 
necessity of these activities. My interest in these specific forms of conduct is triggered by the 
observation that there are a large number of groups involved in the promotion of healthy 
lifestyles, from the state itself to temperance activists to radical ethnic nationalists and 
others. Each group has its own strategy involving different ideas of the “healthy Russian 
body,” its own practices, and different ways of rationalizing these practices. Several authors 
(e.g., Gaufman 2017; Sperling 2016) have drawn attention to how Vladimir Putin himself 
has used athleticism and adherence to a healthy lifestyle as a legitimation strategy and to 
promote a certain image of the “proper” Russian male. Various groups within Russian 
society often explicitly ground the necessity of maintaining a healthy lifestyle in the pursuit 
of a greater good: honoring Russia’s glorious past, reversing the country’s negative 
demographic trends, paving the way for Russia’s re-emergence as a great power, etc. In 
addition to studying how these strategies are different, it is also important to understand how 
they are similar, and in particular how they might reproduce or challenge elements of the 
official discourse.  
This seems to be an understudied area of research, even more so from the angle of 
Foucault and the counter-conducts perspective. Makarychev and Medvedev (2015, p. 47) 
refer to the Kremlin’s resurrection of a Soviet-era physical fitness program as part of the 
“biopolitical turn” in Russia, but the subject is only mentioned in passing. Gabowitsch 
(2016) discusses the Russian Runs [Russkie probezhki], a network of ultranationalist 
organizations devoted to the promotion of physical activity and sobriety. He describes this as 
a form of “subversive temperance” (ibid., p. 8), highlighting the generally anti-Kremlin 
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orientation of this movement’s participants. While this analysis is very useful, I argue that 
focusing only on the oppositional nature of such groups obscures their relationship to the 
broader milieu of healthy lifestyle discourses and practices, which the counter-conducts 
perspective has the potential to make visible. Pain (2014) also notes the prevalence of the 
topic of healthy lifestyle promotion in online communities frequented by far-right Russian 
nationalists. Here again, this exclusive focus on the radical currents of healthy lifestyle 
promotion prevents us from getting a more complete picture of the ecosystem in which such 
currents emerge and develop. Moreover, the emphasis on opposition to the state obscures the 
ways in which the practices of these groups may reproduce the official discourses about the 
Russian body. The notion that resistance may sometimes reinforce vertical power relations 
rather than effectively challenging them is central to Foucault’s understanding of power 
(Foucault 1980, p. 86) as well as Death’s (2016) ideas about counter-conducts.1 Finally, such 
analyses may fail to take into account the practices of groups who enthusiastically support 
the Kremlin but nonetheless have different ideas about what a healthy lifestyle is and how 
and why it should be pursued.  
The topic of healthy lifestyle promotion strategies is interesting for a number of other 
reasons. For one thing, it does not generally involve physical coercion or material sanctions 
and is ostensibly the about self-improvement of each individual who engages in the 
prescribed healthy practices. At the same time, many of the healthy lifestyle promotion 
strategies in Russia seek to mold individuals’ behavior so that it conforms to particular 
understandings about the healthy Russian body and the healthy Russian nation. It could thus 
be interesting to investigate how these strategies produce the desire to conform, functioning 
simultaneously as technologies of domination and technologies of self-improvement. 
Secondly, to the extent that healthy lifestyle promotion is not explicitly a form of political 
participation, it should be revealing to investigate the ways in which national and patriotic 
belonging are reproduced in the “banal” everyday self-improvement practices of different 
groups (Billig 1995). Thirdly, healthy lifestyle promotion is an activity with rich 
metaphorical content. The nation and/or state can be represented as an organic entity with a 
                                               
1 As will be explained in the theoretical section, I approach the ideas of resistance and power from a non-
normative stance that does not imply my personal approval or disapproval of any of the actors analyzed in this 
thesis. For Foucault, resistance is not always something to be celebrated, nor is power by default a negative 
thing. 
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transformable “body” and varying levels of health and vitality, and these representations can 
be linked back to the behavior of individuals.  
My primary research question consists of three parts: “What healthy lifestyle promotion 
strategies are present in Russian society, what discourses does each of them embrace, 
and how do they contest and reinforce one another?” 
First, I establish the theoretical underpinning of the study by presenting the ideas of 
Foucault and later scholars about power, discipline, biopolitics, and counter-conducts. This 
is followed by a brief historical overview of some of the strategies states have pursued to 
physically transform the bodies of their citizens in order to create “ideal” subjects. I then 
elaborate on the idea of counter-conducts to show how contestation of these strategies might 
be conceptualized. After describing the methodology and data collection procedure, I move 
on to the empirical part, in which each strategy is analyzed on the basis of data collected 
mainly from policy and regulatory documents, websites and documents associated with 
state-supported healthy lifestyle initiatives, and online communities associated with the 
alternative healthy lifestyle promotion strategies. In addition to contributing to the somewhat 
sparse body of literature in which Foucauldian insights are applied to post-Soviet Russia, 
this thesis will hopefully shed more light on the interactions between Russian state 
discourse, the discourses of groups usually categorized as oppositional, and those of groups 
more supportive of the Kremlin, with the goal of revealing how they contest as well as 
reinforce each other. 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. Power 
In order to understand how power is exercised over the body to transform conduct, it is first 
necessary to discuss Michel Foucault’s insights on the topic. Classical debates about power 
had developed around the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. These 
writers sought to answer, respectively, the questions of what power does and what power is. 
Machiavelli and Hobbes represented two fundamentally different ways of thinking about 
power. For Hobbes, power was something to be possessed and wielded by an all-powerful 
sovereign, whereas for Machiavelli, power was "decentralized, strategic and contingent" 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
(Stör 2017, p. 143). Foucault did not dispense with either of these notions of power. In 
privileging the question of how power operates over that of what power is, his understanding 
is clearly closer to that of Machiavelli. Foucault even makes the claim that “power as such 
does not exist”; rather than being something which is out there and up for grabs by 
individuals, power comes into existence when it is exercised (Foucault 1982, p. 786). Instead 
of being “acquired, seized, or shared,” power is “immanent” in all types of relationships 
(Foucault 1978, p. 94). Thus, the themes of how power works and what it does run through 
all of Foucault’s writings. 
Nonetheless, Foucault does not fully reject the Hobbesian sovereign; the figure of the 
sovereign forms an important part of his study of how the modern art of government 
emerged, a project which spans his entire bibliography. However, Foucault focuses on the 
historical contingency of sovereignty as a form of government, stating that it “rose up on the 
basis of a multiplicity of prior powers, [...] dense, entangled, conflicting powers” (Foucault 
1978, p. 86). The idea of historical contingencies, phenomena that arise as “one possible 
result of a whole series of complex relations between other events” (Wickham & Kendall 
1999, p. 5), is important to Foucault’s work; rather than simply appearing as the most logical 
form of government over men in the state of nature, the sovereign belongs to a particular 
moment in history. Moreover, for Foucault, while sovereign power may be exercised by a 
monarch or another concrete person, it would be a mistake to equate sovereign power solely 
with the state or with the figure of the sovereign. Foucault’s sovereignty can be found 
“wherever power is deployed to restrain or punish what escapes the bounds of a unified 
scheme of what is right” (Rouse 2005, p. 7), meaning that sovereign power can operate even, 
for example, in the relationships between parents and children (Foucault 1978, p. 85).  
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, first published in 1975, and the first 
volume of The History of Sexuality, first published in 1976, offer valuable insight into 
Foucault’s ideas about sovereign power and the historically contingent ways in which it 
came to influence the European penal system and later society as a whole. "For a long time, 
one of the characteristic privileges of sovereign power was the right to decide life and death" 
(ibid., p. 135). In describing the ritual of public executions, he asserts that such events were 
intended to terrorize the public and remind it of the “unrestrained presence of the sovereign,” 
which is the source of all laws (Foucault 1995, p. 49). A violation of the law is seen as an 
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attack on the sovereign. Foucault emphasizes the theatrical aspect of public executions, 
stressing that this was an important characteristic of each aspect of the process (ibid., p. 49). 
This form of punishment was less about correcting the behavior of wrongdoers than it was 
about exercising and reproducing the absoluteness of sovereign power through the body of 
the criminal and inspiring awe in others. 
However, at a certain point around the beginning of the eighteenth century, an art of 
revolt against the violent exercise of sovereign power began to emerge among the publics 
that assembled to observe the executions (Foucault 1995, p. 60). At this critical juncture, 
“there was a whole aspect of the carnival, in which rules were inverted, authority mocked 
and criminals transformed into heroes” (ibid., p. 61). People began to protest against the 
arbitrary exercise of power and the administration of harsh punishments for offenses they 
regarded as minor. Again, Foucault’s account is deeply historical and is grounded in 
interactions between specific events occurring at the end of the 17th century, rather than 
implying any sort of teleology. He describes the appearance across Europe of a genre of 
literature in which punished criminals were celebrated as martyrs and heroes, followed by 
calls for the reform of the penal system (ibid., p. 68). He maintains, however, that these 
demands were motivated not so much by a newfound regard for humanity or equality among 
men as by the desire for the establishment of “a new 'economy' of the power to punish, to 
assure its better distribution, [...] so that it should be distributed in homogeneous circuits 
capable of operating everywhere, in a continuous way, down to the finest grain of the social 
body” (ibid., p. 80). The idea that the end of the 17th century and the beginning of the 18th 
century was a turning point in the way the state related to the individual recurs frequently in 
Foucault’s work. The move away from sovereign power marks the point at which Foucault 
becomes interested in how power is exercised at the level of individual bodies and how the 
individual is implicated in broader networks of power.  
Thus, from “punishments that were spectacular in their manifestations and haphazard 
in their application” (ibid., p. 87), it became necessary to develop more targeted and more 
regular forms of punishment. This revelation precipitated the birth of the modern prison 
system. Importantly, developing targeted forms of correction and punishment in order to 
optimize the penal system implied coming up with new ways of knowing the individual: the 
criminal’s body became the “domain of a whole series of ‘criminological’ sciences” (ibid., p. 
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74). The idea that power is productive of new forms of knowledge, rather than simply being 
a matter of overt physical coercion, is one of Foucault’s key innovations on the concept. He 
criticizes Marxists for exaggerating the repressive aspect of power: “[P]ower would be a 
fragile thing if its only function were to repress [...] it produces effects at the level of desire 
— and also at the level of knowledge” (Foucault 1980, p. 50). Foucault’s concept of 
“discourse” refers to the socially constructed fields of knowledge or systems of statements 
that render people’s bodies and surroundings intelligible and produce certain types of 
subjects. For example, the discourses of psychiatry and medicine produce the mentally ill 
subject; discourses on penology produce the criminal (Wickham & Kendall 1999, p. 34). 
Discourses of the human body are therefore inextricably bound up with the exercise of 
power. This does not mean that Foucault dismisses all knowledge about the human body as 
invalid or corrupted because of its relationship to power; rather, in asking “how” instead of 
“what,” he seeks to understand how different knowledges (which may well have scientific 
value) are instrumentalized (Faubion 2000, pp. xvii-xviii), such as how new knowledge 
about the body shaped the prison system and vice versa.  
The new forms of punishment, as mentioned, entailed increased attention to the 
individual human body. Foucault stresses that the body had been a site of power since the 
classical age; older forms of power had also sought to produce the “docile body” that could 
be “subjected, used, transformed and improved” (Foucault 1995, p. 136). What was unique 
about the power being exercised on the body on the beginning of the 18th century was its 
sheer scale; it was concerned not just with the body as a “wholesale” object but as a 
mechanism consisting of countless parts; “an infinitesimal power over the active body” 
(ibid., p. 137). Foucault refers to the new methods by which power was exercised over the 
body as “discipline.” While these disciplinary mechanisms had their origin in the prison 
facilities of the 18th and 19th centuries, Foucault stresses that they tended to be “de-
institutionalized” and reproduced at many sites throughout society (ibid., p. 211). Every 
action of this new docile body, from the prison to the classroom to the hospital, was to be 
strictly regimented, from its movement through space and time (enforced by time-tables and 
guides explaining how and in what steps particular actions, such as marching, are to be 
performed) to its handling of objects (for example, weapons) (ibid., pp. 149-155). The 
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success of these mechanisms was reinforced by “hierarchical observation,” “normalizing 
judgement,” and the “examination” (ibid., p. 170).  
Hierarchical observation refers to a form of discipline that “coerces by means of 
observation; an apparatus in which the techniques that make it possible to see induce effects 
of power” (ibid., p. 170). The idea of hierarchical observation originally concerned the ideal 
architectural layout of a prison that would make it possible for the entire inmate population 
to be viewed and monitored from one central point. Foucault describes English law 
philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, a concept prison design that would enable the 
guards to observe the entire prison population from one central tower. The most relevant 
feature of the Panopticon for Foucault was that the prisoners would never know whether or 
by whom they were being observed; power was thus “visible” (in the sense that the guard 
tower could be seen from below) but “unverifiable” (the inmates could never know with 
certainty that they were being watched, or by whom). The strength of such a design was thus 
in its ability to promote adherence to disciplinary practices by inducing a sense of constant 
self-surveillance in the inmates (ibid., p. 201). Far from regarding the Panopticon as an 
outdated and irrelevant blueprint, Foucault asserts that “[w]e live in a society where 
panopticism reigns” (Foucault 2000, p. 58). In this “disciplinary society,” the older forms of 
power have not been replaced, but “infiltrated” by the phenomenon of discipline (ibid., p. 
216). Like sovereign power, it cannot always be traced to any one institution or political 
structure; rather, it is reproduced throughout society in countless forms.  
Foucault asserts that the new forms of punishment were distinguished by their 
connection to the norm. While the exercise of older forms of punishment had been 
characterized by questions such as “was this done?” and “who did it?”, now the question of 
how far an individual’s behavior deviated from a certain norm became relevant (ibid., p. 59). 
The formulation of norms and the exercise of normalizing judgment, in turn, implied the 
production of new forms of knowledge about individual bodies. Normalizing judgement 
individualizes by measuring an individual’s deviation from the norm, but at the same time it 
“imposes homogeneity” by seeking to remedy those deviations (Foucault 1995, p. 184). 
Repression is thus transferred from the physical realm to the symbolic realm by inducing 
individuals to transform themselves into “normal” members of society. Finally, Foucault 
claims that the examination combined both the previously mentioned techniques, 
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constituting the individual as an object of both knowledge and power that can be more 
effectively controlled. It was the examination that would give rise to “sociology, psychology, 
psychopathology, criminology, and psychoanalysis” (Foucault 2000, p. 5). Sporting 
competitions, physical fitness tests and similar undertakings, as discussed by Markula & 
Pringle (2006, p. 42), can be considered as types of examinations that rank, qualify, and 
constitute individuals as objects of knowledge about the human body. This insight will prove 
particularly useful in the discussion about the official healthy lifestyle promotion strategy in 
Russia.  
Foucault intimates that these micro-level practices of disciplining the body were 
conditioned by the relations between European states in the 18th century. This suggestion 
allows us to see a bridge between the politics of the individual body and the larger game of 
geopolitics. Foucault (1995, p. 169) quotes Guibert, a French military scientist, who in 1857 
wrote, “Discipline must be made national. [...] The state that I depict will have a simple, 
reliable, easily controlled administration. [...] It will disprove that vulgar prejudice by which 
we are made to imagine that empires are subjected to an imperious law of decline and ruin.” 
Guibert clearly articulates a connection between practices of disciplining the individual and 
the strength of the state. As will be discussed shortly, similar images of the decay of the state 
and the necessity of disciplining the individual to ensure the survival of the nation were 
evoked in geopolitical texts at the beginning of the 20th century. The appearance of the 
disciplinary techniques and the discourses that produced the new docile body seems to have 
made it possible to begin to think of the “healthy” state in terms of the agility, vitality, and 
efficiency of each individual inhabiting it.  
The beginning of the 18th century also marked an important moment at which the 
state became something “which exists per se” and which should be governed for the sake of 
its own survival, as if it were a natural object (Foucault 1988, p. 151). In most locations, 
government was no longer performed with reference to God or to a sovereign, but to the 
state itself. The new aim of government was to “reinforce the state itself, its own strength, 
greatness and well-being, by protecting itself from the competition of other states and its 
own internal weaknesses” (Dean 1999, p. 104). Foucault describes this new governmental 
rationality as “reason of state” [“raison d’État”]. Government by reason of state required the 
production of new forms of exact knowledge about the strength of the state and the strength 
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of other states in a world marked by struggle and competition. Sadurski (2014, p. 21) points 
out that the concept of reason of state generally has negative connotations in Anglophone 
countries and is associated with that which is “antithetical to currently dominant liberal-
democratic ideas.” Foucault, on the other hand, does not assign any unequivocal normative 
labels to the concept, in keeping with his view that most things are not essentially good or 
bad, but everything is potentially dangerous (Faubion 2000, p. xix). Far from being 
something which is incompatible with liberal government, Foucault regards the appearance 
of reason of state as an essential part of the genealogy of modern liberal society.  
Nevertheless, Foucault does open his discussion of reason of state by referring to 
“mass slaughters” and the “butchery” of war that have often resulted from government in the 
name of the state (ibid., 147). However, the paradox of reason of state for Foucault is the 
“coexistence in political structures of large destructive mechanisms and institutions oriented 
toward the care of the individual life” (ibid., emphasis mine). He thus began to look through 
the historical record to uncover “the techniques, the practices, which give a concrete form 
[...] to this new kind of relationship between the social entity and the individual” (ibid., p. 
153). He defines “police” as the techniques of power and knowledge that were exercised 
over individuals to provide for the strength of the state. The term as it was used in 18th-
century France and Germany did not refer to a specific institution or profession, but a broad 
set of methods and practices. In Germany, the term Polizeiwissenschaft essentially referred 
to the science of the management of the state at the level of individuals. This science entailed 
the development of new techniques and forms of knowledge “for achieving the subjugation 
of bodies and the control of populations” (Foucault 1978, p. 140). One group of such 
techniques was “anatomo-politics”, which was focused on disciplining the individual body 
and constituting it as an object of knowledge and power (ibid.). Discipline and Punish is 
devoted to the genealogy of anatomo-politics and its proliferation throughout society.  
However, during this era, the members of a society also increasingly began to be 
viewed as members of a population, an entity with birth and death rates, levels of health and 
vitality, and various other variables (ibid., p. 25). Populations could be studied and known, 
and if they could be known, they could become the subjects of interventions by the state and 
other institutions. Foucault describes such interventions as “biopolitics,” which operates 
using a form of power known as “biopower” (ibid., p. 140). With biopolitics, the science of 
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demography as the study of the population was born. The latter half of the 18th century saw 
the development of the “medical police,” which was devoted to the regulation of public 
hygiene and social medicine (Foucault 2009, p. 474). Importantly, anatomo-politics and 
biopolitics/biopower have a different underlying rationale than sovereign power; whereas 
sovereign power was characterized by right of the sovereign to take the lives of its subjects 
in as extravagant a way as possible, the new forms of power sought to protect the well-being 
of the population as a way of ensuring the prosperity of the state as a whole.  
Again, this shift toward biopolitics did not take place for humanitarian reasons or 
because death became less acceptable; in fact, Foucault states that “wars were never as 
bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century” (Foucault 1978, p. 136). However, 
rather than being waged with reference to a sovereign, modern wars are waged with 
reference to the survival of the population. Discourses of the human sciences produced by 
biopower thus made genocide and massacres tolerable by referring to the inherent biological 
threat posed by certain elements of the population. While Foucault seems to regard 
biopolitics as a more recent phenomenon, later scholars such as Agamben argue that the 
practice has ancient roots and has always been an integral part of politics (Catlaw 2007, p. 
211). Esposito (2008, p. 43), however, argues that Foucault himself wavers between a view 
of biopolitics as a wholly novel phenomenon and a view of it as a blend of older 
technologies of power; he is reluctant to support either the “continuist hypothesis” or the 
“discontinuist hypothesis.”  
Foucault seems to have taken a middle ground stance on this issue, stressing the 
distinct and innovative nature of biopolitics while not denying that it emerged as the 
interaction of older variations of power. Among the most important of these older forms is 
what he calls “pastoral power”, which was derived from Christian institutions (Foucault 
1982, p. 782). Pastoral power concerned the relation between the pastor and his flock of 
followers. It had several distinct features: 1) its goal was the salvation of each member of the 
flock; 2) it required that the pastor be ready to sacrifice himself for the well-being of the 
flock; 3) it sought to understand the flock as a community but also each member of it as an 
individual; 4) it required access to the inner workings of the mind of each member of the 
flock (ibid.). Like the disciplinary mechanisms that appeared later, pastoral power was both 
individualizing and totalizing; the pastor developed a special body of knowledge about each 
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individual and exercised power by using this knowledge to guide the flock as a whole 
towards salvation. Pastoral power required “a permanent intervention in everyday conduct, 
in the management of lives, as well as in goods, wealth, and things” (Foucault 2009, p. 206). 
Foucault argues that, for several centuries, pastoral power was fundamentally different from 
political power. However, in the 18th century, the two began to merge together, forming, 
along with reason of state, the foundations of modern the modern state (Simons 2013, p. 
312). 
2.2. Strategies for Reforming the Body in 18th-20th Century Europe and Russia 
By the end of the 19th century, the ideas of the state as a natural entity, biopolitics, and 
discipline had begun to inform the emerging discipline of geopolitics. Indeed, Rudolf 
Kjellén, a Swedish political scientist and one of the first geopoliticians, seems to have been 
the first person to use the term “biopolitics” (Lemke 2011, p. 9).  Drawing on the ideas of his 
German predecessor Friedrich Ratzel, Kjellén understood geopolitics as “the doctrine of the 
state as a geographic organism” (Marklund 2015, p. 251). He formulated several sub-
categories to geopolitics, one of which was biopolitics. Kjellén’s biopolitics, in contrast to 
his concepts of topo-politics and morpho-politics, which dealt with the location and spatial 
shape of the state, was concerned with the life and well-being of the people residing in the 
state (Abrahamsson 2013). He thought of states as organic entities with natural borders that 
conformed to a certain community of people. The Darwinian idea of a constant struggle 
between these entities was central to Kjellén’s work, and he was particularly interested in 
how states with less favorable demographic circumstances (such as Sweden at the end of the 
19th century) could survive. He suggested that such states should “use science and 
technology to promote the health, productivity, and growth of the population” to increase 
their competitiveness on the world stage (Marklund 2015, p. 259).  
Kjellén’s biopolitics is thus something similar to Foucault’s reason of state, in that he 
advocates for state to take interest in the health and well-being of individual members of 
society only insofar as it contributes to the strength of the state itself. Foucault’s 
power/knowledge nexus is relevant here: Kjellén’s organic metaphor of the state was 
intentionally based on biological knowledge about the human body (Lemke 2010, p. 423), 
and this body of knowledge was later instrumentalized by National Socialists and others (for 
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example, Latin American military dictatorships) to legitimize the extermination of certain 
elements of society. As mentioned earlier, however, Foucault did not see an inherent danger 
or evil in reason of state or in the organic conception of the state, regarding such 
understandings only as potentially dangerous.  
The organic metaphor is less important to the work of British geographer and 
geopolitician Halford Mackinder; however, he still relies on the idea that the state is 
inherently subject to natural and eternal laws and that its people’s potential can be leveraged 
as a tool of statecraft. His work was inspired by his worries about the survival of the British 
Empire, and he recruited “objective” scientific knowledge in the service of imperialism (Ó 
Tuathail 1996, p. 70). He regarded geographic location as one of the most important factors 
in a state’s success, carving the world up into sea-powers and land-powers and designating 
Eurasia as the “pivot area” from which world domination could be staged. However, he also 
insisted on the importance of “manpower,” which entailed “not only the idea of fighting 
strength but also that of productivity” (Mackinder 1942, p. xxiii). According to Ó Tuathail, 
“By the early twentieth century, [...] strong ‘health’ and ‘national fitness’ movements were 
reconfiguring how the state conceptualized and treated its inhabitants” (1996, p. 70), and 
Mackinder’s academic work and his advocacy for the study of geography developed in this 
context. Mackinder called for new ways of measuring the health and fitness of British males 
— in other words, of turning them into objects of knowledge that could be used as a basis for 
biopolitical interventions by the state. His discourse of manpower “invented a biopower 
front in Britain’s imperialist rivalry with Germany” (ibid., p. 71).  
Scouting for Boys, a manual written by Boer War veteran Lord Baden-Powell in 
1908 that was one of the founding documents of the Boy Scout movement, provides an 
illustration of how Foucauldian discipline and biopower were at work to create the docile 
British (male) body at the beginning of the 20th century through the “micro-physics of 
power” (Foucault 1995, p. 139). The manual contains moral guidance, instructive anecdotes, 
and detailed instructions about how to perform the skills in which each Scout was expected 
to be proficient. Scout training was both individualizing and totalizing; its aim was to 
“replace Self with Service, to make the lads individually efficient, morally and physically, 
with the object of using that efficiency for the service of the community” (Baden-Powell 
2005, p. ii). Every aspect of the Scout’s body, from his attitude towards his country to the 
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way he breathes, is subject to reform and regulation. Patriotism is celebrated as the highest 
value to which all Scouts should aspire. Scouts are described in terms of their utility, as if 
they were part of a larger mechanism: “by becoming a Scout and carrying out the Scout Law 
every boy can be of use” (ibid.). The Scout’s uniform and salute are strictly regulated, and 
time-tables (which were of particular interest to Foucault in Discipline and Punish) chart out 
how each hour of the day is to be spent during Scout camp.   
Scouting for Boys contains an entire chapter devoted to the topic of the practice of 
physical fitness. Scouts are asked as citizens to subject themselves to constant self-
surveillance by “[assuming] responsibility for his own development and health” (ibid., 145).  
The disciplining power of the norm is deployed to produce the docile Scout body; each 
Scout is “measured, and [learns] in which points he fails to come up to the standard” (ibid.). 
The chapter provides a series of exercises to be performed to promote good health, each of 
which is described in detail and accompanied by diagrams of the body to ensure what 
Foucault (1995, p. 151) described as the correct “temporal elaboration of the act.” The 
leaders of each Scout Patrol are given the pastoral task of “[getting] hold of each boy in your 
Patrol and [making] a good fellow of him” in order to ensure the success of the entire troop 
(Baden-Powell 1908, p. 30). Later in the manual, Baden-Powell recalls an encounter he had 
with a drunken fellow Boer War veteran and insists that the good Scout, and by extension 
the good British citizen, has nothing to do with alcohol (ibid., 158). One may discern from 
this anecdote the suggestion that Britain lost the First Boer War in part because of its unfit, 
drunken citizenry.  
The use of physical training programs to foster the strength of the state by nurturing 
its population was not restricted to the British Empire. Other powers had recognized this 
form of discipline as a useful tool before Britain, and still others would do so afterwards. 
Already in the 18th century, the ideas of German physical education theorist Johann 
GutsMuths were being used in the implementation of compulsory physical education 
programs in Danish schools. In Denmark, against the backdrop of revolutions and wars 
across Europe, the gymnastic exercises proposed by GutsMuths were paired with military 
exercises (Pfister 2003, p. 64). In Germany, a philosophy of exercise known as Turnen was 
designed by Friedrich Ludwig Jahn in the early 19th century. Jahn began to develop these 
principles after discovering, in his role as a grammar school teaching assistant, that having 
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his pupils go for walks and play games was the best way of “achieving an internalization of 
discipline” among them (ibid., p. 65). More than a set of exercises to be completed, Turnen 
also incorporated the recitation of patriotic speeches and songs meant to increase Germans’ 
national consciousness. Despite the claim that Turnen was open to all, it was a deeply male-
dominated practice, and its main emphasis was on military preparedness (ibid., p. 67). A 
popular gymnastics movement also appeared in Sweden. The appearance of each of these 
movements was conditioned by the spatial and temporal context in which each state found 
itself (ibid., p. 76).  
It was according to this pattern that the promotion of physical fitness became a 
priority in the Russian Empire. Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War of 1855, the Russo-
Turkish Wars in the 1870s, and regular famines had brought to the fore the need to provide 
for a fitter and more well-nourished population (O’Mahony 2006, p. 125). These events also 
served as reminders of Russia’s general backwardness in relation to the West, which spurred 
Russian leaders to “[refer] more frequently to the experience of Europe” (Polunov 2005, p. 
87). Thus, in 1875-6, Pyotr Lesgaft, a teacher of anatomy, was sent on a War Ministry-
sponsored mission to learn about how physical education was promoted across Europe. 
Upon his return to Russia, he began to write a study that compared German gymnastics, 
Swedish gymnastics, and the system of gymnastics that he himself had developed for use in 
a military training school in St. Petersburg. He eventually concluded that his system was 
superior (Shakhverdov 1951, p. 16). He regarded the English system of physical education 
with a mix of admiration and skepticism about the applicability of foreign philosophies to 
the Russian context: “[it] is readily apparently how much attention is devoted [in England] to 
physical education, how clearly they have articulated the link between physical and moral 
upbringing” (Lesgaft 1951, p. 285). At the same time, he lamented the state of physical 
education in Russia, where  
unlike in Europe [...] there are no original methods or approaches [...] the schools take almost 
no interest in physical education and entrust its instruction to completely ignorant people 
who are familiar only with the methods that have been mechanistically adopted from foreign 
schools or foreign teachers. (ibid.) 
Lesgaft was thus stating the need for the development of new knowledge specific to the 
Russian context that could be used to exercise discipline over Russian schoolchildren. His 
work was built on the idea that a harmonious relationship should be established between the 
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body and mind. He asserted that “the proper functioning of the body’s organs can only be 
ensured through [...] rigidly graduated and vigorous exercises” (ibid., p. 290).  
While Lesgaft’s ideas were an innovation for Russia, his efforts to spark broad 
interest in physical education outside of military academies were largely unsuccessful (Keys 
2009, p. 402). The situation began to change at the beginning of the 20th century, when the 
number of clubs and societies devoted to physical activities began to grow sharply (Riordan 
1977). In 1905, Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War reminded the authorities of the 
population’s low levels of military preparedness. Moreover, they were also guided by the 
fact that “[t]he stereotypical European image of the Russian as a lumbering bear came to be 
seen as an affront to national pride” (O’Mahony 2006, p. 125). The Russian government thus 
began its attempts to centralize physical education and sports. In 1912, a large variety of 
physical education philosophies were being practiced in Russian schools, most prominently 
German gymnastics, Swedish gymnastics, Lesgaftian gymnastics, and finally, a system of 
gymnastics known as Sokol (Goloshchapov 2001, pp. 108-109). Sokol was a nationalist 
sporting and gymnastics movement that had been developed in the Czech region of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. While its Czech version was grounded in Czech nationalism, “the 
Russian Sokol had an underlying great-power ideology” and so it earned the support of the 
Russian government and young Russians after the Russo-Japanese War (Riordan 1977, p. 
35).  
In its attempts to gain more control over physical education and promote physical 
fitness, the Russian government established the Chancery of the Central Department for the 
Physical Development of the population in 1913. The Russian Scouting movement was also 
initiated by tsarist army officers. According to Goloshchapov (2001), the Japanese defeat 
had moved the government towards a view in which physical education was no more than an 
instrument to ensure military preparedness. Accordingly, practices that were perceived as 
unnecessarily holistic, such as those of Lesgaft (who held ideas about the unity of body and 
mind and had a deeply philosophical outlook), were marginalized (ibid., p. 108). By the 
beginning of World War I, the new government department had been given control over all 
Russian sports clubs (O’Mahony 2006, p. 126). Meanwhile, the sale of vodka in Russian 
cities was banned to prevent a repeat of 1905, when widespread binge drinking had 
supposedly hobbled the war mobilization effort (Nemtsov 2011, p. 21). A year after the ban 
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had been initiated, I. N. Vvedenskij wrote an article in which he reported on the successes of 
the anti-alcohol campaign and its contribution to the war effort, noting that “[i]ndividual 
failures and violations of discipline took place only where the reservists got access to spirits” 
(Vvedenskij 1915). Vvedenskij lobbied for the state to extend the prohibition indefinitely but 
ultimately failed. 
The Bolshevik Revolution saw the further centralization of physical education. The 
concept of “physical culture” [fizicheskaia kul’tura or fizkul’tura] was developed in the 
1920s and was meant to establish norms for physical exercise as well as all other forms of 
conduct. Although fizkul’tura was largely dedicated to the production of a fit pool of citizens 
to serve in the military, it also explicitly revived Lesgaft’s holistic approach that stressed the 
connection between physical and moral fitness. It was imagined as a new lifestyle and not 
just a way for Soviet citizens to spend free time or achieve physical fitness. It was meant as a 
way to craft the new docile, healthy Soviet body by subjecting it to new forms of discipline: 
“In our Soviet circumstances, we must doggedly fight for a new healthy way of existence, 
because the old existence [...] was unhealthy from start to finish” (Starikov 1930, p. 78). 
There was thus a clear articulation between transformation of the self and transformation of 
the state. Participation in fizkul’tura was represented as a civic duty (O’Mahony 2006, p. 
138). Along with fizkul’tura came the fizkul’tura parades [prazdniki fizkul’tury], which took 
place all across the Soviet Union and involved mass choreographed gymnastics displays. 
Such displays were adapted from the Sokol school of gymnastics mentioned above 
(Goloshchapov 2001, p. 34). Bourdieu (1992, p. 69) suggests that such collective 
demonstrations impose discipline on the body by “ordering thoughts and suggesting feelings 
through the rigorous marshalling of practices and the orderly disposition of bodies.” They 
also serve as a way of visually representing the united national body (Keys 2009).  
In 1931, the Ready for Labor and Defense [Gotov k trudu i oborone, GTO) program 
was launched by the state. GTO was meant to further popularize physical activity by 
encouraging citizens to test their proficiency in a variety of exercises and be awarded with 
badges for meeting or exceeding the normal levels of competence [normativy]. It was also 
designed to foster patriotism. The competitive nature of GTO signaled a broader change in 
the attitude towards competitive forms of physical activity, as opposed to pure gymnastics, 
with the latter giving way to the former (Keys 2009; Louis & Louis 1980). After the 
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introduction of fizkul’tura, GTO, and physical education in Soviet schools, the population’s 
involvement in physical activity increased sharply. In the lead-up to World War II, during 
the war, and afterwards, the Soviet authorities emphasized the connection between 
fizkul’tura and the heroic defense of the Motherland, a theme which was prominent in the 
visual culture of the time (O’Mahony 2006, pp. 145-150). After the end of the war, stories of 
individual victories and acts of heroism on the front began to be used as stimuli for Soviet 
citizens to aim for physical and moral perfection (Kharkhordin 1999, p. 237-238). 
The development of the competitive sport infrastructure became a high priority after 
World War II, when the Soviet Union began to send participants to international sporting 
competitions (Louis & Louis 1980, p. 5). Goloshchapov (2001, p. 101) argues that the Soviet 
authorities began to invest more resources in this area because sporting victories were 
considered an important source of the state’s international prestige and strength. On the 
domestic front, participation in international competitive sports was also presented as a way 
to bind the multinational Soviet people together, as illustrated by a propaganda poster 
featuring a Russian athlete and his Uzbek counterpart running side by side, with the caption 
“To Our Unbreakable Friendship! To New Successes in Sports!” and a large banner in the 
background reading “300 Years Since the Reunion of Russia and Ukraine” (“Sovetskie 
plakaty sport”). The goal of the Soviet physical education system seemed to be the 
production of obedient bodies that were inscribed with selfless patriotism and the discourse 
of fraternity between the peoples [druzhba narodov] to provide for the greatness of the 
Soviet state.  
The purpose of this historical overview was to demonstrate some of the ways in 
which discipline and biopower have sought to create docile and patriotic bodies in the 
service of the state. These techniques of power are not always “wielded” exclusively by the 
state and can be found throughout society (for example, in educational institutions and 
scouting clubs), although the symbol of the state is often used to promote discipline. The 
promotion of physical fitness in the Soviet Union seems to have been primarily non-
coercive; it worked in large part by leveraging new knowledges about the human body to 
generate new images of the normal/fit citizen and subjectivities toward which people would 
themselves aspire. Тhe proliferation of images throughout Soviet society that emphasized the 
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greatness and moral righteousness of the fizkul’turnik and of Soviet athletes provided 
inspiring new subjectivities and models of behavior for emulation by Soviet citizens.  
Foucault’s understanding of power and discipline not require that individuals are not 
free and have no control over their actions; on the contrary, all individuals are free because 
they are presented “with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several 
ways of reacting and modes of behavior are available” (Foucault 1982, p. 790). However, the 
“micro-penalties” associated with not conforming to norms, including, for example, social 
isolation, compel people to submit to the disciplinary techniques being used on their bodies 
(Markula & Pringle 2006, p. 44). The bodily reform strategies discussed in this section can 
thus still be considered to represent a form of symbolic repression, even when they lack a 
clearly punitive or restrictive element (which may have indeed been present to some degree 
in the case of the Soviet Union). Apart from avoiding micro-penalties, another incentive to 
submit oneself to discipline is the possibility of being rewarded for complying, which 
Foucault regards to be more effective in disciplinary societies than outright punishment: “the 
lazy [are] more encouraged by the desire to be rewarded in the same way as the diligent than 
by the fear of punishment” (Foucault 1995, p. 180).  
2.3. Contestation and Resistance 
Most of Foucault’s earlier work focused on how certain subjectivities were produced as 
effects of knowledge and power and made available to individuals or imposed on them. 
Thus, even though he had always tried to draw attention to the fact that power does not 
necessarily involve the use of force or overt coercion, most of his work on discipline and 
power did not leave much room for individual agency, making resistance and contestation to 
dominant power strategies seem impossible. “Perhaps I’ve insisted too much on the 
technology of domination,” Foucault confessed in one of his late works (Foucault 1988, p. 
19). However, he eventually became interested in how individuals craft their own 
subjectivities and how they govern themselves as opposed to simply being objects of 
government. “If the formation of subjectivities is a central part of power strategies, than [sic] 
self-formation is a central part of the resistance that these strategies provoke” (Mitcheson 
2014, p. 65). As Markula (2003, p. 98) puts it, Foucault began to move from the study of the 
outside (“how individuals are subjected to knowledge”; “how individual subjects act upon 
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each other”) to that of the inside (“the individual’s relationship with his or her self”). He thus 
proposed the concept of technologies of the self,  
which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain 
number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so 
as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, 
perfection, or immortality. (Foucault 1988, p. 18)  
Foucault contrasted technologies of the self with technologies of power, “which determine 
the conduct of individuals” from the outside (ibid.). He explored the role of technologies of 
the self in ancient Greece, where care for the self was considered a civic duty. Just as 
knowledge is produced by the external subjugation the individual, technologies of the self 
allow one to develop knowledge about oneself. Ancient technologies of the self included 
writing, physical deprivation, and sporting activities, among others. 
However, importantly for Foucault, because “[p]ower is everywhere” (Foucault 
1978, p. 93), there is no “self” that governs itself and makes itself into a certain type of 
subject independent of relations of power. This stems from Foucault’s opposition to the 
humanist notion that each individual has a “true self” that can be revealed (Markula & 
Pringle 2006, p. 139). He believed that there is no “self” prior to discourses, systems of rules 
which set the bounds of the knowable and the say-able. There is no pre-discursive self 
because “there is no body, no sexuality, no gender, and no subjectivity before inscription in 
language” (Carter 2013, p. 585). Discourses in turn are produced by power, which Foucault 
believed to be inherent in all social relationships. Already in the first volume of the History 
of Sexuality, Foucault began to develop the idea that any given social unit is pervaded by a 
multiplicity of power strategies, which “are the basis for wide-ranging effects of cleavage 
that run through the social body as a whole” (Foucault 1978, p. 94). He asserts that power 
strategies are everywhere and that there is nothing “outside” of the web of competing 
strategies. The various power strategies presuppose different types of subjects, have different 
objectives, and imply different ways of producing that subject: “there is no power that is 
exercised without a series of aims and objectives” (Foucault 1978, p. 95). However, Foucault 
stresses that while these power strategies are intelligible to the analyst and have their own 
internal logic, they are not the result of the choice of any individual actor. While power 
strategies are distinct, they are also mutable and heterogeneous. They are mutable because 
they change as they interact with each other, sometimes appropriating elements of other 
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relations in order to become stronger, although not necessarily on purpose. They are 
heterogeneous are composed of a “multiplicity of discursive elements” (Foucault 1978, p. 
100) that may be shared among different power strategies and that may contradict one 
another.  
The idea that power is everywhere does not mean that technologies of the self are an 
illusion and that people are not free after all, but rather that in engaging in practices of the 
self, people are still operating within the context of the various discourses and power 
strategies that are present in their social environments. Resistance is possible because 
individuals are free and they can adopt “different strategies in response to the strategies of 
domination” (Mitcheson 2012, p. 66), but this choice never takes place outside of the context 
of power relations. Moreover, in taking up practices of the self, people may “reproduce 
existing patterns of interaction” between power relations (ibid., p. 65). For example, a person 
who decides to stop drinking alcohol for purely personal reasons is still doing so within the 
bounds of a discourse that establishes alcohol consumption as an undesirable behavior for 
physiological and/or social reasons. A person who decides to go to the gym to pursue his or 
her personal fitness goals still does so in the context of discourses regulating the “fit” body 
and the “unfit” body, which are effects of power. Therefore, technologies of the self are 
always embedded in specific discourses and power relations and are located at the nexus 
between self-conduct and conduct from the outside.  
In order to better understand this dynamic, Foucault introduced the concept of 
“governmentality”: the “contact between the technologies of domination of others and those 
of the self” (Foucault 1988, p. 19). This concept stemmed from his understanding of 
“government” as the “way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be 
directed” (Foucault 1982, p. 790), or, put another way, the “conduct of conduct” (Foucault 
2009, p. 389). His study of Christian pastoral power led him towards some important 
insights about the interplay between government from the outside and resistance. As part of 
his Security, Territory, Population lecture series, he began to speak of resistance to the forms 
of conduct being exercised by the pastor in the Christian church. He stressed that the term 
conduct [conduite] has more than one meaning: it can refer to the act of conducting (i.e., 
directing) others or oneself, and it can also refer to the way in which one person conducts 
others or conducts himself (ibid., p. 258). Pastors sought to modify the conduct of each 
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member of the flock so that they may be led towards salvation. However, movements began 
to appear that sought  
to be conducted differently, by other leaders [conducteurs] and other shepherds, towards 
other objectives and forms of salvation, and through other procedures and methods. They are 
movements that also seek, possibly at any rate, to escape direction by others and to define the 
way for each to conduct himself (ibid., p. 259).  
The specific pastoral “counter-conducts” (ibid., p. 268) Foucault describes are asceticism, 
the formation of communities independent of the Church, mysticism, the reading of 
Scripture, and the belief that the end times were about to happen (“eschatological beliefs”). 
These counter-conducts were each associated with particular practices of the self that sought 
to create new kinds of subjects toward different ends and by different means. Foucault 
identifies asceticism as a counter-conduct because its practitioners sought to develop mastery 
over their own bodies by subjecting them to constant trials and making them impervious to 
suffering, undermining the pastor’s ability to enforce their obedience. The communities that 
were formed separate from the Church often rejected the authority of the pastor by claiming 
that he himself was in a state of sin or the embodiment of the Antichrist (ibid., p. 275). 
Mysticism involved nurturing the belief that a person could become one with God, which 
removed the need for a pastor as a mediator between the two. The reading of Scripture 
served a similar function: those who had access to it had no need for an interpreter. Finally, 
the belief that the end times were near implied a belief in the impending return of God to 
earth, which would remove the need for a pastor who guides his flock towards salvation 
(ibid., p. 281). 
However, Foucault stresses that while such counter-conducts sought to modify 
existing power relations, they “did not have as their objective how to get rid of the pastorate 
in general, of any pastorate, but rather: how to benefit from a better pastorate, how to be 
guided better, more certainly saved, maintain obedience better, and approach truth better” 
(ibid., p. 231). Therefore, while a counter-conduct might be identified by its outright 
rejection of the pastor, the most important feature of a counter-conduct is its practitioners’ 
desire to be governed differently, which might even imply being governed more. Foucault 
was careful not to equate counter-conducts with concepts such as “revolt,” “disobedience,” 
and “dissidence,” which he believed did not capture “more diffuse and subdued forms of 
resistance” and carried too many normative connotations (ibid., p. 200). Moreover, Foucault 
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discusses how the pastorate itself was often forced to adopt elements of the various counter-
conducts in order to remain dominant (ibid., p. 215), illustrating his point about the 
mutability of power relations.  
I argue that this counter-conducts approach can be used as a lens through which to 
analyze the non-hegemonic healthy lifestyle promotion strategies in Russia. Such an 
approach “looks within government to see how forms of resistance rely upon, and are even 
implicated within, the strategies, techniques and power relationships they oppose” (Death 
2016, p. 210), allowing us to see how the discourse of groups nominally opposed to the 
Russian state may still reinforce certain aspects of its biopolitical strategy. On the other 
hand, it also makes it possible to see how groups and individuals that openly support the 
state may propose alternative subjectivities and biopolitical practices. Finally, it can offer 
insight into how the state itself might change its biopolitical strategy in response to these 
biopolitical counter-conducts. An objection to the use of this approach might be that 
Foucault wrote about the pastorate as a form of government that preceded biopolitics. 
However, as noted earlier, Foucault also stressed that the pastorate was a foundational 
element of the modern state and that many of its aspects persisted beyond the 18th century.  
A further objection (e.g., Said 1988; Plamper 2002; Engelstein 1993) could be that 
the concepts of the pastorate and pastoral counter-conducts, as well as virtually all of 
Foucault’s ideas, were developed with reference to Western Europe and Western Christianity 
and thus may not be applicable to Russia. Foucault himself (Foucault 2009, p. 155) intimated 
that the “Eastern Christian pastorate” might have had unique features for which he could not 
account. While I agree that the Foucauldian framework should not be applied randomly and 
without reflection, I follow Kangas (2015, p. 488) who suggests viewing it “less as a 
historical schema and more as a flexible analytical tool” that can be tested in a variety of 
contexts. A full Foucauldian genealogy of the Russian Orthodox pastorate, its counter-
conducts, and its contribution to the structure of the modern Russian state, which might be 
required to settle the question of applicability, is beyond the scope of this study. Kangas also 
cautions against restricting Foucault’s ideas about government to bounded territorial units, as 
doing so can obscure the continuities between modes of government in different countries 
and reproduce the idea of a “special path” for Russia that does not lend itself to outside 
analysis (ibid.). Moreover, Gaufman (2017, p. 76) convincingly demonstrated how the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
concept of the pastorate could be applied to Russia, suggesting that it may indeed be an ideal 
lens through which to study forms of government in illiberal settings “given [their] reliance 
on detailed knowledge of individuals and incomplete transition to the administrative state.”  
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3. Research Design and Methodology 
3.1. Clarification of Research Question and Methodological Approach 
 
The main research question of this thesis is the following:  
“What healthy lifestyle promotion strategies are present in Russian society, what 
discourses does each of them embrace, and how do they contest and reinforce one 
another?” 
I use the term “healthy lifestyle promotion strategies” to refer to the discourses and practices 
used by the Russian state and state-sponsored institutions to encourage the uptake of healthy 
lifestyles and as well as the competing discourses and practices (the “counter-conducts”). 
The use of the word “strategy” is meant to convey the notion that the state as well as each of 
the “counter-conducts” have their own objectives and reasons for pursuing those objectives. 
It is also intended to encompass discourses as well as the healthy lifestyle practices which 
are given meaning by those discourses. By “healthy lifestyle promotion,” I refer primarily to 
the promotion of physical fitness, participation in sports, sobriety, smoking cessation, and 
abstinence from drugs.  
 The basic methodological approach I will use to analyze the healthy lifestyle 
promotion strategies is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA “employs interdisciplinary 
techniques of text analysis to look at how texts construct representations of the world, social 
identities, and social relationships” (Luke 1997). It is not a linguistic exercise but an 
examination of social phenomena, and it is particularly interested in power and “the role of 
discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance” (van Dijk 1993, p. 249). It is 
therefore well-positioned to analyze how the official healthy lifestyle promotion strategy in 
Russia is constructed and how these forms of conduct are contested and reproduced. 
However, while CDA is typically aimed at “the power elites that enact, sustain, legitimate, 
condone or ignore social inequality and injustice” and has the agenda of promoting social 
justice (ibid., p. 252), I take a less normative stance more in line with Foucault that 1) does 
not view power as fundamentally oppressive, 2) looks past the “elites” to also examine how 
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power is exercised by and within other groups, and 3) does not make any claims or 
assumptions as to the “righteousness” of these groups.  
While there is no such thing as “the Foucauldian method” if “method” is taken to 
mean a rigid set of rules, steps, and ways of interpreting data (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine 
2008; Hook 2001), Foucauldian analysis can be deployed in a wide variety of contexts 
depending on the particular research question at hand. I therefore augment my approach with 
Foucault’s insights about power, discipline, the production of subjectivities, technologies of 
the self, and other ideas. While Foucault himself was mostly interested in “historical 
documents, legal cases, sets of rules and descriptions of institutional practice,” the kinds of 
texts to be included in a Foucauldian-style discourse analysis depend entirely on the research 
task (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine 2008, p. 14). I embrace a broad understanding of the 
term “text” that encompasses “anything that generates meaning through signifying practices 
[...]. This includes the generation of meaning through images, sounds, objects […] and 
activities” (Barker 2004, p. 199). The sources from which I will draw these “texts” are 
described in more detail in the next section.  
3.2. Data Collection and Research Design  
The primary units of analysis in this study are “healthy lifestyle promotion strategies.” While 
my initial instinct had been to compare and contrast the official healthy lifestyle promotion 
strategy with a singular hypothetical “nationalist” one, a review of the relevant literature on 
the ideological divisions in Russian society made it clear that this distinction might obscure 
more than it would reveal. Laruelle (2009, p. 10), for example, points out that “nationalism 
has come to dominate the whole political spectrum and constitutes the common denominator 
of political correctness” in Russia. Moreover, the landscape of groups and ideological 
currents typically associated with “nationalism” in Russia is quite diverse and does not lend 
itself to a single label. Another option would have been to identify the strategies solely on 
the basis of their advancement by groups that openly oppose the Putin regime. However, as 
Cheskin and Marsh (2015) point out, consent and dissent are both multi-layered phenomena 
in Russia; Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party, for example, advances a 
hardline imperialist and populist politics that could be considered more extreme than that of 
Putin and United Russia but still maintains “almost unconditional support for the political 
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establishment” (Laruelle 2009, pp. 98-99). The counter-conducts approach makes it easier to 
account for counter-hegemonic healthy lifestyle promotion strategies that nonetheless do not 
necessarily seek to challenge or subvert the authority of the Russian state.  
Therefore, to figure out what alternative strategies of healthy lifestyle promotion 
were present in Russian society, I began the process by developing a pool of primary data 
and then forming categories on the basis of those data, rather than developing categories 
first, collecting data, and then sorting the data into those rigid categories. This procedure 
resembles the first two steps of the “grounded theory” research method, in which the analyst 
“collects some data, explores the data through initial open coding, establishes tentative 
linkages between categories, and then returns to the field to collect further data” (Willig 
2013, p. 72). The point was to avoid imposing artificial categories onto the data to the 
greatest extent possible. I did, however, begin by presuming the existence of an “official” 
strategy advanced by the Russian state as well as institutions and organizations affiliated 
with or financed by the state. Below I will describe how I collected the initial data and 
identified some of the alternative strategies. 
A necessary first step was surveying the Russian internet in order to reconstruct the 
ideological landscape of groups involved in healthy lifestyle promotion. This is based on the 
assumption, following Pain (2014), that Russian social media platforms are generally a 
reliable mirror of the ideological divisions in Russian society. As a starting point, I searched 
VKontakte (vk.com), the largest Russian-language social networking platform, for 
communities that published content related to the promotion of healthy lifestyles by using 
keywords in Russian such as “healthy lifestyle” [zdorovyj obraz zhizni], “ZOZh” (an 
abbreviation of the term “healthy lifestyle” in Russian), “sobriety” [trezvost’], and “health of 
the nation” [zdorov’ye natsii]. In addition, I focused mainly on pages that made frequent 
reference to themes such as Russia, the Motherland, or the Russian nation, as opposed to 
ones that contained generic information about health and fitness. 
Then, I attempted to reveal links between these different communities and with other 
websites. A convenient way of discovering links between groups on VKontakte and 
elsewhere on the internet is by looking at a group’s “links” [ssylki] section, where the page’s 
administrators can manually input links to related groups and websites. Group administrators 
can also link directly to external content that they feel is appropriate for their communities. 
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A cursory analysis of the content in each community/on each website was also performed to 
begin to get a picture of the discursive fields in which they might be embedded. After I had 
analyzed this initial pool of data, some “clusters” of groups that were related because of 
similar ideological content or affiliation with particular movements or organizations had 
begun to form. Based on these clusters, I drew up three categories, which I took to represent 
separate “counter-conducts” advancing different healthy lifestyle promotion strategies. 
While subsets of each of the strategies could conceivably be identified, the following three 
seemed to be the largest possible categories that are still more or less internally coherent:    
1. The “teetotaler” strategy. This strategy is made up of groups whose primary area of 
activity is informing the Russian public about the dangers of alcohol, tobacco, and 
drugs, and lobbying the government for a total ban on the sale of alcohol. It 
represents a blend of, among other elements, anti-Western conspiracy theories, 
Soviet nostalgia, and medical discourses and has its roots in the perestroika-era 
temperance movement. I identified the two must influential organizations belonging 
to this strategy as the Society of the Fight for the Nation’s Sobriety [Soyuz Bor’by za 
Narodnuiu Trezvost’ or SBNT] and Common Cause [Obshchee delo] based on the 
number of times that these groups were linked and referenced on pages belonging to 
this strategy.  
2. The “imperial ethnic nationalist” strategy. I associate with this strategy groups that 
ground the legitimacy of their practices in the idea that the ethnic Russian nation is 
being threatened by vices such as drinking and physical inactivity. They appeal to the 
greatness of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union to attract followers and 
generally have an oppositional view of the state. They have a highly messianic view 
of their cause and prioritize garnering the attention of the public. The most prominent 
group is the Russian Runs [Russkie probezhki] network, which has a large presence 
on VKontakte.  
3. The “Straight Edge” strategy. This strategy belongs to groups that explicitly adhere 
to the Straight Edge lifestyle, an international subculture that involves total 
abstinence from alcohol, tobacco, and drugs, and in the Russian case, intense 
physical training. In my search, I discovered that virtually all these groups also 
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professed a white nationalist/neo-Nazi ideology. Pursuing a healthy lifestyle is 
framed as necessary for the salvation of the ethnic Russian nation but also for that of 
the white race. These groups have low public visibility because of their violent 
ideology and staunch opposition to the state. The largest communities devoted to the 
Straight Edge on VKontakte (by number of followers) are Fine Line [Chyotkaya 
gran’] and Iron Rus [Zheleznaya Rus’].  
 
During the next stage of my research, I analyzed the official strategy by conducting a 
thorough reading of regulatory and policy documents related to healthy lifestyle promotion, 
and I also considered materials related to the state’s flagship initiative to promote physical 
activity, Ready for Labor and Defense [Gotov k trudu i oborone, GTO]. I then analyzed 
materials published by Sober Russia, an organization sponsored by the Russian state. Next, 
the websites and/or VKontake communities for each of the groups named above were 
considered. On the VKontakte groups, I only considered top-level posts; that is, I only read 
content posted by group administrators and disregarded comments left by other users. My 
analysis was supported by the qualitative research software MAXQDA, which helped me 
keep track of the broader themes and discourses underlying each strategy and allowed for 
cross-strategy comparisons. All the materials come from after 2009, with the majority 
having been published during the period of 2012-2018. 
3.3. Limitations 
One of the main limitations of this study is that it deals primarily with how certain strategies 
seek to reform conduct and create new subjects but does not account for the success of those 
strategies, nor is it sufficient to provide an understanding of how certain healthy lifestyle 
practices are “translated” by the individual people who adopt them. After all, “meanings are 
never simply inscribed on the minds and bodies of those to whom they are directed or on 
whom they are ‘imposed’ but are always reinscribed in the act of reception” (Toews 1987, p. 
884). Answering these questions would have required a different methodology that involved 
directly interviewing individuals involved in the various strategies I have identified. While 
this would have been fruitful and could be pursued in future research, my study is more 
concerned with the “input” than the “output” of these strategies. Moreover, because of the 
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secretive and anonymous nature of the activities of many of the groups involved (e.g., neo-
Nazis involved in the Straight Edge subculture), contacting and developing rapport with 
them would have proved difficult, especially for a foreign researcher.  
 A further limitation of this study is its bias toward explicitly patriotic discourses and, 
thus, its exclusion of the more generic or internationalized healthy lifestyle discourses that 
might be discovered, for example, in the Russian editions of international lifestyle 
publications. Taking these into account might have offered interesting insight into how the 
more cosmopolitan self-improvement discourses in Russia compare and contrast to the 
patriotic ones. However, because of space and time constraints, I decided to focus on the 
discourses that in one way or another seemed to frame leading a healthy lifestyle as an 
imperative of being a good Russian citizen or member of the Russian nation. 
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4. Healthy Lifestyle Promotion Strategies in Russia 
4.1. The Official Strategy 
As in the rest of the world, the Russian state imagines its population as a natural entity with 
its own dynamics and characteristics that can be governed and transformed. Anxiety about 
the demographic situation of the Russian population is the fundamental factor undergirding 
the state’s healthy lifestyle promotion strategy and permeates all of the other strategies 
analyzed in this thesis. This is due to the fact that the collapse of the Soviet Union was 
accompanied by a catastrophic rise in mortality and a corresponding decrease in Russia’s 
birth rate, the country’s first such peacetime “demographic shock”; moreover, despite some 
improvements in the 2000s, the overall downward trend of Russia’s population seems 
indefinite (Eberstad 2010).  
Central to the Russians state’s efforts to reverse the negative demographic trends 
have been measures aimed at reducing the population’s consumption of alcohol, tobacco, 
and narcotics. The primary objectives of its anti-alcohol strategy are the “reduction of the 
volume of alcohol consumption […], the improvement of the country’s demographic 
situation, an increase in the population’s life expectancy, a reduction in mortality, and the 
creation of stimuli to engage in a healthy lifestyle” (“O kontseptsii realizatsii”). Excessive 
alcohol consumption is named as “a nationwide threat on the level of the individual, the 
family, the society, and the state” (ibid.). The demographic well-being of the country and its 
physical security, as well as the stability of all other social institutions, are thus constructed 
as matters of individual conduct, the transformation of which requires biopolitical 
intervention by the state. 
The 2009 “Concept of State Policy for the Reduction of the Scale of Alcohol Abuse,” 
the most explicit articulation of the state’s anti-alcohol policy, stresses that before the 1970s, 
the volume of alcohol consumption in Russia was lower than in Europe, which seems to 
reflect a general tendency to use Europe as a yardstick of Russia’s progress. The rise in 
alcohol abuse beginning in the 1970s and reaching a crescendo in the early 1990s is 
explained partially by “a shift in priorities in favor of economic interests, to the detriment of 
the population’s health”; similarly, the increase in illegal drug use is attributed to “a shift in 
personal attitudes toward consumeristic values” (ibid.). These cause-effect attributions seem 
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to imply that during the Soviet period, the state was better able to safeguard the well-being 
of the population as it had total control over all means of production, and the population’s 
conduct, in turn, was uncorrupted by the hedonistic consumerism that accompanied the 
collapse of central planning. Companies producing alcoholic beverages are also represented 
as amoral actors who make profits by concealing the alcoholic content of their products and 
using eye-catching labels to attract the attention of young Russians (ibid.), whose 
consumption of alcohol is seen as having particularly ruinous implications for the country’s 
economy. However, the consumption of alcohol is not seen as totally incompatible with a 
healthy lifestyle, nor is the legitimacy of alcohol production as an economic activity rejected 
outright; the state seeks to increase the market share of “high-quality Russian wines” in 
order to “promote cultured alcohol consumption” (ibid.). 
The Russian state’s anti-alcohol and anti-narcotic measures stress that informational 
campaigns must be used to redefine Russians’ relationships with their bodies and with other 
bodies. The transition to a healthy lifestyle must occur not only on the level of bodily 
practices, but also on the level of thoughts and attitudes; it is framed as a matter of individual 
and collective morality. Among the state’s objectives for such informational campaigns are 
“the reorientation of the population toward the conduct of a sober and healthy lifestyle” and 
“the bolstering of the morality and self-identity of children and young people with the goal 
of enabling them to effectively abstain from the consumption of alcohol” (ibid.). Along with 
the 2010 Strategy for the State’s Antinarcotic Policy’s description of the danger of “the 
spread of tolerant attitudes toward the non-medical use of narcotics” (“Ob utverzhdenii 
Strategii gosudarstvennoj”, IV.23.a) and the 2009 anti-alcohol strategy’s assertion of the 
necessity of “promoting intolerant attitudes towards displays of excessive alcohol usage” 
(“O kontseptsii realizatsii”), these statements evoke the idea of a field of competing 
discourses about what constitutes appropriate conduct and an enlightened, paternalistic state 
that is responsible for guiding its population toward the correct one.  
  A further assumption that seems to underlie the state's anti-drugs and anti-narcotics 
policy is that increased drug and alcohol use in Russia are primarily the result of a 
systematic campaign by foreign actors to undermine Russian national security. The Strategy 
for the State’s Anti-Narcotic Policy lays out the need to counter “narco-aggression” 
[narkoagressiya] (ibid.), which creates the subject position of a conscious aggressor. Among 
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the proposed solutions to the problem of illegal drug use is increased surveillance over 
foreign citizens residing in the country, reflecting the idea that the drug problem is caused or 
exacerbated by foreign influence and betraying a securitization of this discourse. Moreover, 
the previously mentioned emphasis on shifting values and attitudes about drugs and alcohol 
also betrays the notion that external forces are working to erode the health of the Russian 
population by morally corrupting them, which belongs to a “general discourse over cultural 
contamination by foreign liberal values” (Marshall 2014, p. 17).  
The promotion of sports and physical activity is proposed as a solution to the 
problems of alcohol and drug abuse, reflecting the view that these activities are useful in 
transforming the individual both inside and out. The concept of “physical culture” 
[fizkul’tura], formulated during Soviet times, is still used by the Russian state and has 
persisted intact, referring to the rejuvenation of the mind through the rejuvenation of the 
body. It forms part of the title of the primary document regulating the conduct of sports and 
physical activity in Russia: “On Physical Culture and Sport.” This document defines 
“physical culture” as  
that subset of culture comprising the range of values, norms, and knowledge that are created 
and used by society with the objectives of increasing the individual’s physical and 
intellectual capabilities, perfecting his motor skills, and instilling a healthy lifestyle; 
socialization through physical education, physical preparedness, and physical development. 
(“O fizicheskoj kul’ture i sporte”, 2.26)  
This moral and physical development of the individual is explicitly linked to the Russian 
state’s prestige on the world stage: “The involvement of the masses in physical culture and 
the state of the population’s health [...] are undeniable proof of the vitality and spiritual 
fortitude, as well as the military and political might, of any nation” (“O federal’noj tselevoj 
programme”, p. 7). This reflects a view of the state as a natural entity whose greatness and 
competitiveness are bound up with the physical well-being of its inhabitants. An 
instrumental function of the state’s physical culture strategy is the formation of a pool of 
potential future competitive athletes, who are to be constituted as athletic subjects from an 
early age.  
Foucault was interested in how power was exercised over spaces, which led him to 
study how Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon promoted internalized discipline and social 
control. The Russian state’s healthy lifestyle promotion strategy places a heavy emphasis on 
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spatiality. The regulation, renovation, and construction of sites of physical activity is 
envisioned as crucial to the maintenance of the nation’s physical health. Certain spaces are 
designated as “sites of sport” [ob”ekty sporta] which are to be used and governed according 
to specific rules (“O fizicheskoj kul’ture i sporte”, 2.7). For example, these sites must be 
equipped with video surveillance systems that enable the identification of individuals from a 
distance (ibid., 37.9). In addition, individuals can be designated or volunteer as stewards 
[kontrolyory-rasporyaditeli], who receive extensive training on the enforcement on how to 
enforce proper conduct among spectators during sporting events, particularly football 
matches. The stewards are endowed with the authority to determine whether an individual 
belongs at a site of sport and enforce the standards of behavior laid out in federal law. The 
Ministry of Internal Affairs also keeps a running list of individuals whose presence in these 
spaces is prohibited (“Spisok lits”). These mechanisms ensure that attendees of sporting 
events and other such gatherings are in a state of constant vigilance and obedience to the 
accepted forms of conduct in such spaces.  
The most prominent initiative in the field of physical education is the "Ready for 
Labor and Defense" program, or GTO (Gotov k Trudu i Oborone). GTO, as mentioned 
previously, was introduced during the 1930s as a way of encouraging the masses to engage 
in physical culture, as well as to increase the military readiness of Soviet citizens. The 
program was resurrected on Putin's orders in 2014. It was, however, going to be rebranded 
with a new name that maintained the original acronym: “I Am Proud of You, My 
Fatherland” (Gorzhus’ Toboj, Otechestvo). In the end, Putin elected to preserve the original 
name of the program "as an homage to tradition and our national history" (“Putin podpisal 
ukaz”). In maintaining its original name, Putin was clearly counting on the symbolic power 
of Soviet nostalgia to attract people to the reinvigorated GTO. The move reflected a longing 
for a past in which the people were physically and morally fit and in which patriotism was 
expressed at the level of the individual body.  
This sense of nostalgia for a bygone era is vivid in the narrative of the program’s 
history on the official GTO website: “...back then, more than half of the country’s population 
were GTO medalists, and everyone was ready for labor and defense!” (“GTO, Istoriya 
GTO”). It emphasizes the role GTO played in protecting the Soviet Union from external 
enemies, securing the country’s victory over Nazi Germany, and ensuring its international 
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sporting prestige in the post-WWII period. The narrative of the original GTO ends with the 
sober statement that “The fall of the Soviet Union led to a collapse in the efforts to engage 
the population in physical activity” (ibid.). This implies that a strong state should have a 
leading role in intervening in the bodily practices of the citizenry.  
The new program’s stated objectives are:  
an increased capacity to take advantage of the opportunities presented by physical culture 
and sport in maintaining health, forming harmonious and well-rounded individuals, fostering 
patriotism, and ensuring continuity in the physical education of the population. (“Ob 
utverzhdenii polozheniia”, II. 5) 
Another explicit goal of the new GTO is to “instill in the population a conscious desire for 
systematic participation in physical culture and sports, physical perfection, and the practice 
of a healthy lifestyle” (ibid., II. v). In this way, it seeks to transform ways of thinking about 
conduct and make self-work in the service of the state a priority. Absent from the decrees 
and handbooks about the GTO are explicit references to increasing the population’s overall 
military preparedness; however, given the fact that the program was preserved with its 
original name (“Ready for Labor and Defense”) and the way in which it is tied into the 
narrative about Soviet resilience during World War II, it can be hypothesized that this is one 
of the objectives. The concluding section of the GTO website’s “History” page, titled “Why 
Participate in the GTO in the 21st Century?”, also emphasizes the importance of physical 
fitness in being a successful participant in a competitive market economy. Thus, while the 
state still has a dominant role in the new GTO, the program also seeks to produce neoliberal 
subjects who are “compelled to assume market-based values in all of their judgments and 
practices in order to amass sufficient quantities of ‘human capital’ and thereby become 
‘entrepreneurs of themselves’” (Hamman 2009, p. 38). 
The themes of unity and belongingness can be met throughout the GTO promotional 
materials and handbooks, in many ways mirroring the Soviet discourse of “fraternity 
between the peoples.” The idea of the country as a team [komanda] is used to increase the 
popularity of the program; for example, in late 2017 and early 2018, a centrally-organized 
series of GTO testing festivals was held nationwide under the title “One Country, One 
Team!” (“Vserossijskij fizkul’turnyj festival’”). The notion of a team implies a set of shared 
attitudes and objectives, while also creating a subject position for a coach or team leader 
responsible for facilitating the team’s harmony. The GTO is also seen as a way of promoting 
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“national self-identification” and “national consciousness” (“My - Komanda GTO!”, p. 12); 
presumably, it is envisioned as a path toward affirming oneself as a member of the Russian 
nation. On the other hand, it is also fundamentally rooted in post-WWII discourses of 
individual victories, heroism, and the ascetic subjection of the body to the will (Kharkhordin 
1999, pp. 237-238). These two dimensions are encapsulated in the refrain of song published 
on the GTO’s official VKontakte page titled “Be Victorious!” [“Pobezhdaj!”]:  
Every day, be victorious over yourself [sam sebya pobezhdaj] / Be resilient, flexible, and 
strong! / Fulfill the tests of the GTO, be a part of Team Russia! / Work on yourself and train 
your spirit [dukh zakalyaj] / To be energetic, swift, and active! / Get everyone around you  
excited about sports / And all of Russia will be healthy! (“VFSK GTO”). 
As in Soviet times, the GTO requires participants to complete of a series of “tests” 
[ispytanie], or physical exercises. For each gender and age group, there is a set of mandatory 
exercises. Participants can choose to compete for a bronze, silver, or gold medal; each medal 
level requires each exercise to be completed a certain number of times, with a certain speed, 
or with a certain level of proficiency (these requirements are called normativy). To find out 
one’s normativy, one must visit the GTO website’s calculator and enter in his or her age and 
gender. For example, according to the calculator, an 18-year-old male who wants to try for a 
bronze GTO medal must be able to do ten chin-ups and run three kilometers in no more than 
14 minutes and 30 seconds, among other requirements. Elective exercises include 
swimming, long jumping, rowing, shooting, and others. Each federal subject is also 
encouraged to include traditional/ethnic group-specific sports in its local program. There are 
extensive rules regulating how each exercise must be performed (“Metodicheskie 
rekomendatsii”), including the timing, (Foucault’s “temporal elaboration of the act” 
[Foucault 1995, p. 151]), the positioning of the body (the “correlation of the body and the 
gesture” [ibid., p. 152]), and, for exercises involving weapons or other equipment, the way in 
which these objects must be handled (the “body-object articulation” [ibid.]).  
 The exercises and their corresponding normativy are used to fulfill two purposes: on 
one hand, they help individuals assess their own physical fitness; on the other hand, they are 
used by the state to gauge the physical fitness of the population overall (“Ob utverzhdenii 
polozheniia”, 9a-9b). The disciplinary component of the GTO is abundantly clear. The GTO 
serves as an “examination” in the Foucauldian sense: something that ranks, qualifies, and 
renders individual Russian bodies knowable and transformable by others as well as by the 
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self. With its focus on medals, it rewards rather than punishing (gold medalists even receive 
extra points when applying to universities [“Metodicheskiye rekomendatsii”, p. 141]). 
Drawing upon a potent reservoir of symbols and references to a shared Soviet past, the GTO 
is used to construct (in material terms and in the sense of the creation of new subjectivities) 
the fit Russian body. 
4.1.1. Outsourcing Healthy Lifestyle Promotion: Sober Russia 
As is the case in any country, the Russian state’s biopolitical agenda is deployed by a large 
number of actors. One of the most visible actors advancing the state’s healthy lifestyle 
promotion strategy is an organization called Sober Russia [Trezvaya Rossiya]. The state-
funded “federal project” was launched in 2012 under the leadership of Sultan Khamzaev, a 
native of the Republic of Dagestan who holds the title of Coordinator of Interethnic and 
Interconfessional Relations for Putin’s United Russia party (“Zapusk federal’nogo proekta”). 
Its mission is to “protect Russian citizens from the threat presented by alcohol and drugs, 
promote the practice of a healthy lifestyle, and popularize the GTO” (“O proekte”).  
The most visible activities of Sober Russia are its “anti-alcohol raids.” During these 
raids, representatives of the organization work with journalists and police to expose 
shopkeepers who sell alcohol and tobacco products to minors, without the appropriate 
labeling, or outside of the hours stipulated by the law. Videos of these raids are published 
across the organization’s social media pages, accompanied by lengthy texts condemning the 
shopkeepers. By March 2017, Sober Russia claimed to have conducted 1300 such raids 
(Trezvaya Rossiya 2017, March 30). Another typical activity of A Sober Russia is the 
organization of open-air fitness classes, runs, and cycling competitions. These events are 
meant to capture the attention of passersby and convince them to get involved in physical 
activity (Trezvaya Rossiya 2015, June 2). In putting their bodies on display, participants 
attempt to influence the public’s understanding of normal conduct and the normal body. This 
genre of healthy lifestyle promotion resembles the “fizkul’tura parades” of Soviet times and 
also mirrors that of some of Russia’s radical nationalist groups. 
As part of its educational program, Sober Russia conducts “sobriety lessons” in 
schools across the country, in which representatives of the organization lecture about the 
dangers of alcohol consumption. A typical lesson includes a showing of a short animated 
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film titled “A Lesson in Sobriety” [“Urok trezvosti”], in which the organization lays out its 
view of the stakes involved in not practicing a healthy lifestyle. Alcohol consumers are 
portrayed as societal rejects whose brains are chemically incapable of producing authentic 
happiness; alcohol violates a person’s contact with his untainted inner Self. The disreputable 
excessive alcohol drinker is contrasted with the athletic, self-disciplined, and successful 
sober person, reproducing the link found in the official discourse between abstinence from 
drugs and alcohol, sports, and moral purity. According to the film, many of the ethnic groups 
comprising the gene pool [genofond] of Russia are genetically predisposed towards 
alcoholism and can become addicted after one short bout of heavy drinking. In these 
populations, “the products of the breakdown of ethanol are not removed from the body, but 
rather accumulate in the blood” (“Urok trezvosti”). This notion resembles the “firewater 
myths” that appeared when European colonists in the Americas first made contact with 
Natives, according to which “White drunkenness was interpreted as the misbehavior of an 
individual; Native drunkenness was interpreted in terms of the inferiority of a race” (Coyhis 
& White 2002, p. 2).  
The topic of gender roles and gender relations is prominent in the film. It stresses that 
alcohol can lead to a hormonal imbalance that causes women to become more like men and 
vice versa. Viewers are also reminded that alcohol consumption can lead to impotence and 
decreased sexual potency in males. By contrast, the film emphasizes that alcohol can lead to 
promiscuous behavior [dostupnost’] in women and makes them unattractive. An illustration 
of two disheveled and intoxicated women appears on the screen, and the narrator comments, 
“Guys, alcohol doesn’t make you look good either. Think about what kind of girl you want 
to attract: this kind of girl?” Thus, female drunkenness is constructed as more of a moral 
failing than is male drunkenness, which is bad primarily because of its implications for the 
man’s ability to attract and mate with women. Alcohol is bad because it disrupts proper 
Russian gender roles, which are laid out in the following way:  
Guys, you were created to be great, to conquer new heights and to be real men! Each of you 
was made to be a protector of women, children, and the Motherland; to serve as a role model 
for young boys, and to inspire the admiration of women and the pride of your parents! You 
were made to be strong. Girls, you were created to be beautiful, gentle, and inspiring; not to 
be used, but rather to be loved!  (“Urok trezvosti”). 
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At the end of the video, viewers are admonished to “fight back against the propaganda of 
degradation,” reproducing the idea that alcoholism and drug use result from of an intrusion 
of non-Russian values. Against the backdrop of the Soviet war song “The Sacred War” 
[Svyashchennaya vojna], which fades into the Russian national anthem, the faces of 
influential figures from Russian and Soviet history appear, including Yuri Gagarin, 
Aleksandr Pushkin, Mikhail Kalashnikov, Georgy Zhukov, and finally, Vladimir Putin, who 
is depicted in a judo uniform taking down an opponent. The viewers’ affective ties with 
symbols and personalities from Russian and Soviet history are leveraged to spur them into 
abstaining from alcohol and also to promote the idea of Putin as the ideal ruler and the ideal 
Russian male.  
While the discourse of Sober Russia seems to be composed of more or less the same 
elements as that of the state and can be considered a part of the official strategy, these 
elements are often expressed more explicitly and more boldly. For example, the 
organization’s VKontakte page is rich with posts criticizing bureaucrats and regional 
governors for relaxing anti-alcohol legislation, which is seen in terms of a crude pursuit of 
profits that undermines the nation’s health and security: “The Ministry of Finance’s inhuman 
initiative [to relax the regulations on the sale of alcohol online] to sabotage the nation’s 
security fuels contempt for certain government institutions. In their quest for profits, these 
bureaucrats are releasing an atomic bomb” (Trezvaya Rossiya 2017, September 15). Another 
post laments the use of Soviet symbols on alcoholic products, which “discredits the idea of 
military glory [...] has a negative effect on the youth, turns a symbol of pride for the 
Motherland into a source of profits” (Trezvaya Rossiya 2014, October 1). The idea of a 
concerted anti-Russian conspiracy is also more prominent in the discourse of Sober Russia, 
as expressed in a post about how powdered alcohol from the United States was slated to 
appear on the Russian market. The post, titled “Americans are Planning to Get Russians 
Drunk with Dry Vodka,” alleges that the American companies producing powdered alcohol 
understand the health risks associated with their product and have given up on trying to sell 
it in the United States but have no regard for the health of Russians (Trezvaya Rossiya 2015, 
June 11). 
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4.2. The Teetotaler Strategy 
The teetotaler strategy is largely informed by the teachings of Vladimir Georgevich 
Zhdanov, an activist and the founder of a number of organizations dedicated to developing 
non-medical interventions to cure alcoholism, drug addiction, poor eyesight, and other 
afflictions. Zhdanov’s methods are inspired by those of Fyodor Uglov, a surgeon renowned 
for his volunteer work during the siege of Leningrad (“Fyodor Uglov”) and later as the 
leading voice in the anti-alcohol movement during the final years of the Soviet Union (White 
1996, p. 169). Uglov petitioned Gorbachev’s government to introduce a total ban on the sale 
and production of alcohol within the Soviet Union, as well as harsh punishments for public 
drunkenness and the consumption of moonshine (ibid.). In 1988, Zhdanov and Uglov 
cofounded the Society of the Fight for the Nation’s Sobriety [Soyuz Bor’by za Narodnuyu 
Trezvost’ or SBNT]; after the latter’s death, Zhdanov became its chairman, a title which he 
holds to this day. 
As in the official strategy, the teetotaler strategy sees the pursuit of a healthy lifestyle 
as a question of morals as well as a necessary condition for Russia’s great power revival: 
“the sobriety of the nation is the foundation of the spiritual, moral, economic, and 
demographic rebirth of Russia” (“O soyuze bor’by za narodnuyu trezvost’”). Two major 
ways in which this strategy differs from the statist strategy, however, is 1) its zero-tolerance 
attitude towards alcohol and tobacco, and 2) the elaborateness of its narrative about a 
conspiracy to destroy the Russian state and its people. I have identified it as a counter-
conduct because its followers desire to govern and be governed by different means (namely, 
a total ban on alcohol and other strict measures), although not necessarily by a different 
leader. In advocating for a stronger and more punitive state, promoters of this strategy want 
to be governed more.  
Apart from SBNT, another prominent organization founded in part by Zhdanov is 
Common Cause [Obshchee delo], whose name is derived from its slogan: “A Healthy Russia 
is Common Cause.” Its objectives include “supporting, developing, and realizing presidential 
initiatives in the area of preserving the health of the nation,” “the popularization of a healthy 
lifestyle,” and “changing society's attitude towards alcohol and tobacco, particularly among 
the youth, making them understand that the consumption of alcohol and tobacco is 
incompatible with a fulfilling, healthy, and happy life at the level of the individual, the 
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family, and society as a whole” (Obshchee delo 2012). Another stated goal is the 
strengthening of the moral foundations of Russian society (Obshchee delo, “Ob 
organizatsii”). To meet these objectives, activists from Common Cause develop educational 
materials, deliver lectures on the topic of healthy lifestyle practices, create various 
multimedia products, and organize a variety of demonstrations and events to advance their 
worldview. 
Like Sober Russia, Common Cause travels to schools around Russia to deliver 
lessons about the dangers of alcohol. A thorough handbook with an outline of how such a 
lesson should be conducted is published on the organization’s website; this plan was 
approved for use in Russian classrooms by the Russian Ministry of Education (Obshchee 
delo, “Programma dlya profilaktiki”). A common thread throughout the handbook is the idea 
that alcohol and tobacco companies and hostile foreign actors manipulate people to turn a 
profit, an element which was present in the official discourse but more elaborately expressed 
here. According to the handbook, alcohol producers use popular movies and television 
shows to brainwash viewers into believing that alcohol consumption is normal and stylish. 
Cocktails and other sugar-filled alcoholic drinks exist to trick children into consuming 
alcohol. Alcohol and tobacco companies advertise their products as legal for consumption 
only by people over 18 in order to manipulate children into thinking that smoking and 
drinking are markers of adulthood. The handbook also decries the “myth of cultured 
drinking,” according to which certain types of alcohol are safe to drink in small quantities, 
insisting that no amount of alcohol can be consumed without inflicting harm on the body 
(ibid., p. 21). To followers of this strategy, as to teetotalers in 1830s Britain, “the idea that 
man must trust his reason in not drinking excessively [is] foreign. Impulse renunciation and 
the control of desire and spontaneity [are] best served only by total sobriety, which [ensures] 
self-command” (Sulkunen & Warpenius 2000, p. 428).  
The notion that foreign alcohol and tobacco corporations (described by Zhdanov as 
the “mafia” [Obshchee delo 2016b]) are in league with treacherous Russian bureaucrats to 
profit from the destruction of Russians’ health, while also pursuing geopolitical goals, is a 
common theme throughout this discourse. One advertisement designed by Common Cause 
depicts a group of Soviet soldiers and is accompanied by the text, “Thank you, granddad, for 
our Victory [spasibo dedu za Pobedu, a common expression of gratitude to World War II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
veterans] / but the enemy has gone another route / he’s poisoning your grandchildren with 
alcohol / and killing them with tobacco!” In the corner of the advertisement is a map of 
Russia overlaid with the flags of Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 
caption explains that over 97 percent of tobacco and 90 percent of alcohol consumed in 
Russia is produced by foreign companies and admonishes the reader to “Be worthy of your 
ancestors! [...] Stop giving money to people who are destroying our country!” (Obshchee 
delo, “Plakaty sotsial’noj reklamy”). This advertisement tries to modify its viewer’s conduct 
by appealing to Soviet nostalgia and framing abstention from alcohol and tobacco as a 
matter of national security. The use of the term “the enemy” [vrag] also implies the existence 
of a timeless, decentralized force determined to destroy Russia and its people. Drinkers and 
smokers are thereby constructed as anti-Russian traitors, a sentiment echoed by a Spetsnaz 
officer and supporter of Common Cause in one of the organization’s promotion videos: 
“Every person who quits smoking makes one less enemy, one more plus for our team [...] 
our granddads, our ancestors, died so that we could live. And if you smoke, you’re just 
betraying your ancestors!” (Obshchee delo 2016c). 
Nevertheless, there is a tension in this discourse between, on the one hand, the idea 
that people who drink and smoke are immoral traitors and, on the other hand, that they are 
innocent victims of manipulation. The overview video for Common Cause goes as far as to 
claim that “people do not choose to smoke or drink; rather, they do so as the result of the 
cold financial calculations of a third party” (Obshchee delo 2015d). People are thus either 
completely free agents or they are ensnared in externally-imposed ways of thinking about 
conduct and must consciously resist them. It could be said that this strategy, with its focus on 
conspiracy theories and its concern with manipulation and deception, seeks to make 
individuals conscious of these various discourses that silently act on their behavior (i.e., the 
hegemonic discourses about alcohol consumption according to which moderate alcohol 
consumption is acceptable) and give them the ability to challenge existing power relations 
through the banal act of abstaining from drinking and smoking. However, proponents of this 
discourse do not generally challenge the authority of the president; their anger is directed 
towards regional politicians and bureaucrats throughout the various ministries. The state 
itself is to be given more power to enforce the moral order advanced by the teetotalers.   
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The idea of a departure from “traditional Russian values” is present in a more explicit 
form than in the official discourse. As in the official policies, the Common Cause school 
handbook stresses the claim that Russia was one of the soberest countries at the turn of the 
20th century, specifically comparing it to the United States and the countries of Europe, but 
that “in order to weaken and then destroy our country and reduce our population, the idea of 
the normalcy of alcohol consumption was drilled into the minds of the Russian people” 
(“Metodicheskoe posobie”, 22).  Moreover, it claims that the widely held belief that drinking 
is a national tradition in Russia was engineered by hostile forces and imposed on Russians in 
order to hobble Gorbachev’s anti-alcohol campaign and topple the Soviet Union. According 
to the Common Cause-produced film “History of a Deception,” foreign aggressors and 
wicked capitalists had been trying to turn Russians into drunkards for several centuries. 
However, they failed each time as the population refused to give up its sober way of life and 
revolted against the foreign merchants and their domestic collaborators (Obshchee delo 
2014b).  
This strategy shares the same concern with gender relations as Sober Russia. The 
educational handbook repeats the claim that the consumption of alcohol leads to the 
masculinization of women and the feminization of men, in addition to impotency (ibid., p. 
7). Smoking and drinking are again seen as particularly immoral vices when women partake 
in them; the film “History of a Deception” describes with approval how women in ancient 
India were punished by having bottle-shaped marks branded onto their foreheads with hot 
metal to warn men not to court them. The handbook “Relationship Constructor” reminds 
girls that if they smoke or drink alcohol, “no serious man will pay any attention to [you]. If a 
man is looking for a serious relationship, he will seek out a girl without unhealthy habits” 
(Obshchee delo 2016a, p. 11). Moreover, abstention from smoking and drinking is an 
important component of “moral purity”, which is an inherent characteristic of women but not 
necessarily of men (ibid., p. 12). Masculinity, in turn, is tied to athleticism, strength, and the 
ability to protect women. The anxiety about maintaining traditional gender roles is also 
expressed as a condemnation of homosexuality. One of Common Cause’s promotional 
videos features an athlete who warns male viewers that smoking, in addition to simulating 
the act of fellatio, furthers the homosexual agenda because “all of the world’s tobacco 
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companies give money to [LGBT organizations] [...] so, think about it: if you’re a smoker, 
then what are you — pro-gay?” (Obshchee delo 2015c).  
The topics of genocide and extinction [vyrozhdenie] are also prevalent in this 
strategy. References to the treatment of Native Americans by European settlers and their 
descendants can be found throughout the materials of Common Cause and SBNT. According 
to the narrative, the Natives were forced to succumb to the settlers only after their bodies and 
minds had been weakened by alcohol. There is an anxiety that Russians will face the same 
fate and that the enemies of Russia will only be satisfied “when the last Russian drops dead 
into the grave, like the Indian in America” (Obshchee delo 2015b). This narrative seems to 
be used to convince people of the inherently genocidal character of Europeans and 
Americans as well as to create anxiety about the “colonization” of Russia by hostile outside 
forces. However, the genocide is being waged from within as well as without, primarily by 
money-hungry bureaucrats. Soratnik, the official newspaper of the SBNT, is full of open 
letters to the government and to the president asking for specific bureaucrats to be dismissed 
or punished as traitors, such as the following one, in response to a proposal by the Russian 
Ministry of Industry and Trade [MinPromTorg] to relax the regulations about where alcohol 
can be sold:  
Just what is the ministry trying to achieve? The answer is obvious: an increase in alcohol 
sales for the purpose of making a profit [...] The MinPromTorg’s proposal means that the 
ministry is sabotaging Russia’s anti-alcohol policies[...]. it will result in thousands more 
deaths, suicides, rapes, thefts, and more street violence, as well as orphaned children. How 
can people who propose such inhuman policies be in charge of ministries? Dmitri 
Anatolevich [Medvedev]! I implore you to fire the bureaucrats responsible for these 
provocations. (“Gnat’ sabotazhnikov!”, p. 1) 
The language of war is used to emphasize the stakes involved in the campaign against the 
genocide. Supporters of the teetotaler movement are addressed and referred to as soratniki, 
which translates approximately to “comrades in arms” and carries military connotations. 
Notably, the members of Russian National Unity, an ultranationalist organization founded in 
the early 1990s whose mission was to safeguard the health and purity of the (ethnic) Russian 
nation, also addressed each other as soratniki (Shenfield 2001, p. 131). Though this may 
well be a coincidence, it demonstrates that these movements emerged from a similar 
discursive field in which Russia and its people are being besieged by aggressors and enemies 
and individuals must join the “fight.” A more muted form of this militarism can also be seen 
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in the official discourse in terms such as “narco-aggression” (“Ob utverzhdenii Strategii 
gosudarstvennoj”).  
What is not always clear in this discourse is who the objects of genocide are 
perceived to be: the ethnic nation or the civic nation. Common Cause nominally adheres to 
the principle of “national neutrality,” a recognition of the fact that “Russia has for centuries 
been a multinational country [...] and the organization’s work regards all citizens as equal, 
without exception” (Obshchee delo 2015d). Its materials abound with references to the 
rossijskij (civic Russian) nation, as opposed to the russkij nation, which commonly refers to 
ethnic Russians. The idea that certain ethnic groups in Russia are exceptionally prone to 
becoming alcoholics is reproduced alongside the claim that alcohol is a “genetic weapon” 
that has already wiped out “several ethnic groups of the Russian far north” (Obshchee delo, 
“Glavnyj faktor vyrozhdeniya”). At times, however, they stress that the ethnic Russian 
nation has always been at the vanguard of the anti-alcohol movement: “Slavic Russians gave 
up their lives and their freedom for the cause of sobriety; they raided pubs and protested 
against forced intoxication [spaivanie]” (Obshchee delo 2014a). The combination of these 
discursive elements suggests that while the concern about alcohol abuse and genocide is 
oriented toward the entire Russian citizenry, the strategy privileges a view of this citizenry in 
which the ethnic Russian nation plays the role of the “big brother.” 
Finally, the strategy draws on scientific discourses to emphasize the fatal 
implications smoking and alcohol can have for genetic purity. Deploying constant detailed 
references to DNA, it stresses that men and women (but especially women) who consume 
any amount of alcohol or tobacco run the risk of producing genetically, physically, and 
intellectually inferior offspring. The idea of the gradual genetic degradation of the Russian 
people is weaved into the narrative about how these substances represent an existential threat 
to the country. The practice of a healthy, sober lifestyle is thus constructed as a way to return 
the Russian nation to its pure, sober essence. The “genetic code” is also described as “the 
treasure of the nation” that is facing the threat of destruction, seemingly suggesting that the 
peoples of Russia are united a common genetic heritage (Obshchee delo 2015a). Lemke 
(2011, p. 100) observed that “In contrast to ‘racial hygiene,’ human genetics today is 
directed not at the body of the population but at the genetic makeup of the individual. The 
central goal of genetic interventions [...] is less the health of the public at large or some other 
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collective idea and more an attempt to improve the health of individuals and to help them 
avoid illness.” The coexistence in this strategy of a concern for individual genetic hygiene 
and a concern for the collective genetic hygiene of the Russian population suggests that this 
statement is not necessarily universally applicable and that this form of biopower can still be 
found in some settings.  
Sulkunen & Warpenius (2000) demonstrate that the rise of temperance movements in 
Western Europe and the United States was closely linked to the appearance of representative 
institutions. Temperance activists sought to inscribe their sense of moral superiority and their 
“romantic search for authenticity” (ibid., 431) onto the state’s rationale of government. 
Moreover, “The enlightened nation-state, imbued with aspiration and commitment to moral 
and social progress, was thought to be the external instrument for constructing the inner Self 
of citizens” (ibid., 430). Given the Russian temperance movement’s origins in the era of 
perestroika and glasnost’, these observations seem to have a broader applicability. As in the 
West, these organizations seek to create a strong, messianic Russian state with the capacity 
to enforce self-discipline among its citizens. However, I argue that the Russian teetotaler 
strategy is unique because it blends together anti-Western conspiracy theories, Soviet 
nostalgia, militarism, and medical discourses to act on people’s conduct, whereas similar 
movements in the West were unable to move beyond narrow arguments about the negative 
effects of alcohol on will power and therefore ultimately became irrelevant (ibid., 429). The 
eclectic nature of the Russian teetotaler strategy suggests that it might eventually have more 
influence and staying power than its Western equivalents. 
4.3. Running for Russia: The Imperial Ethnic Nationalist Strategy 
In 2014, a report by the Russian SOVA think tank observed: “The topic of healthy lifestyles 
plays a particularly important role for all shades of modern Russian nationalism, which over 
the last 20 years has gradually been pushed out of the political arena by the government” 
(Pain 2014, p. 18). Healthy lifestyle promotion thus represents a way for ultranationalists to 
effect change in society and advance their ideas about proper conduct in the absence of a 
political outlet to do so. The imperial ethnic nationalist strategy is epitomized by an 
organization called Russian Runs [Russkie probezhki]. As I will demonstrate, it is 
differentiated from the other strategies primarily by its explicit concern for the ethnic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
Russian nation, its particular forms of visibility and ways of attracting followers (namely, 
mass coordinated demonstrations of strength and agility), its high level of militarism, and its 
generally oppositional stance toward the state. As a counter-conduct, it seeks government by 
different means, toward different ends, and by different leaders. However, I will also show 
that this strategy has notable similarities with the other ones under analysis. 
The first Russian Runs were held in January 2011 on the heels of the nationalist 
revival prompted by the 2010 Manezhnaya Square riots (Nikiporets-Takigava & Pain 2016). 
Yudina et al. (2012) attribute the appearance of the movement to two additional trends: 1) 
Russian nationalists’ increased interest in portraying themselves in a positive, non-
aggressive light, and 2) the increasing popularity of sports and physical fitness among 
Russian nationalist youth. Gabowitsch (2016, p. 2) describes the Russian Runs as a “network 
movement”: it has no hierarchy or central command but rather is made up of a horizontal 
nationwide network of groups operating under the banner of the Russian Runs. Apart from 
its focus on public demonstrations, it has some other trademark features, including its 
participants’ use of the yellow-and-black Russian Imperial flag (also known as the imperka), 
which forms part of the movement’s main logo, as well as its use of pithy slogans and cheers 
[krichalki] that are yelled out during public events and express the essence of the movement, 
including “Russians Choose Sport!” [Russkie vybirayut sport!] and “Russian Means Sober!” 
[Russkij znachit trezvyj!]. 
The Russian Runs’ unofficial, decentralized nature means that social media networks 
— namely, VKontakte — play an important role in its proliferation throughout the country 
(as well as in several other former Soviet republics). At the time of this study, the main 
Russian Runs VKontakte page had over 17,000 subscribers; its content is a mixture of 
original posts and reposts from regional Russians Runs VKontakte groups and other groups 
involved in healthy lifestyle promotion. It describes the movement’s mission as “the 
promotion of healthy lifestyle practices and sports first and foremost among the Russian 
[russkij] population on account of that population’s extinction, its extermination, and its 
historical and contemporary role in Russia’s emergence, existence, and prosperity as a state” 
(Russkie probezhki, “Informatsiia”). 
The Russian Runs’ ambition to play by the rules of the game, portray themselves as 
practitioners of the “healthy Russian nationalism,” and attract followers by setting an 
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example rather than recruiting outright is evident in the movement’s Charter, which is 
published on its main page on VKontakte. It lays out the runs’ goal as “letting every member 
of society know that a healthy lifestyle [ZOZh] and sports are the normal ways of life by 
setting an example and doing sports in public” (Russkie probezhki 2016, p. 1). The emphasis 
on influencing by example reflects the movement’s desire to establish its forms of conduct 
as the norm and marginalize those who act contrary to this norm: “the average Russian 
doesn’t like us because we force him to feel ashamed about his beloved daily bottle of beer” 
(ibid.). Participants are instructed to “yell joyously, light-heartedly, and in a friendly way,” 
to smile and wave at passersby and keep in mind that they might be frightened or 
intimidated, because “there must only be a positive opinion about us!” (ibid.). They are 
cautioned not to use any symbols or cheers that violate Russian law or contain curse words. 
Moreover, the Charter emphasizes the non-political nature of the Russian Runs and reminds 
participants that their personal political views should remain at home. The movement is thus 
careful not to frame itself as a form of civil disobedience or a protest movement, “which 
everyone is sick and tired of” (Russkie probezhki 2012). 
At the same time, the Russian Runs’ distrust of the authorities is clear. Its 
participants are wary of the prospect that the government might infiltrate the movement in 
order to portray it as an extremist organization and use that as a pretext to outlaw it. “The 
powers-that-be don’t like us; we’re a community of friendly (but unified) healthy young men 
and women with an active position in life. And they don’t know whether we’re planning to 
open up a chain of sports clubs or topple the government, because they think our promotion 
of a healthy lifestyle is just a cover for something else” (Russkie probezhki 2016, p. 1). A 
post from the Krasnodar branch of Russian Runs warns readers of the opening of a new 
sports club in the city whose logo uses the Celtic cross (a symbol often used by white 
nationalist and neo-Nazi organizations) and whose organizer has appeared in pictures 
wearing a t-shirt with the emblem of the Ukrainian Azov Battalion. “There is no doubt that 
this ‘club’ is operating at the behest of the powers-that-be. After all, they want Russian 
sports and nationalism to correspond to the image created by the lying mass media” (Russkie 
probezhki Krasnodar 2015, July 6).  
Moreover, the Russian Runs’ stated commitment to non-aggression and cooperation 
with the authorities is belied by its heavily militaristic discourse, as well as its sponsorship of 
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activities such as hand-to-hand combat classes and weapons trainings. As opposed to the 
runs, these activities are often held in forests and other remote locations away from the gaze 
of the public and the police (e.g., Russkie probezhki Petrozavodsk 2014, April 13). The 
trainings are meant to mimic real-life situations, and their purpose seems to be actual 
preparation for battle as opposed to the mere pursuit of physical fitness. The imagined 
opponents are most frequently migrants and ethnic minorities. For example, a post from 
Krasnodar emphasizes the importance of learning how to handle combat knives in addition 
to becoming proficient in hand-to-hand combat: “All guys who practice hand-to-hand 
combat are naturally inclined to defend their women and their families and to not shy away 
from conflicts in the streets, but they completely disregard the fact that almost all ethnic 
criminals are armed with knives. If you don’t have any knife skills, you’re a dead man 
walking, one-hundred percent” (Russkie probezhki Krasnodar 2013, July 9). It is worth 
noting, however, that the frequency of posts related to migration in the group dropped 
dramatically after 2013, the specific issue of migration into Russia being subsumed under 
the broader topic of the global refugee crisis. This shift is in line with broader Russian 
society’s declining interest in this issue in the wake of the Ukrainian conflict (Laine 2017).  
Even before the events in Ukraine, however, the Russian Runs were envisioned as a 
way of stirring Russian national consciousness and representing the unity of the peoples of 
Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus: “As the Runs take place primarily in Russia, Ukraine, and 
Belarus, one of its goals is to unite the Russian people across its native lands — after all, we 
are one people, one state! And the Imperial flag [...] serves as a symbol of the unity of our 
people and our state” (Russkie pobezhki 2012). In this way, participating in the Runs is a 
way of constituting oneself as a member of the ethnic Russian nation and constituting one’s 
land as a distinctly Russian space. It is also a way to use the body to advance geopolitical 
claims about Russia’s neighboring countries. This particular form of representing the unity 
of the people is not unique to the Russian Runs: the Soviet authorities deployed the same 
techniques in orchestrating the mass fizkul’tura parades (Keys 2009), and, as Boyer (2005, p. 
109), observes,  
The Nazi emphasis on mass, coordinated movement can be understood as a performance 
designed to simulate the ideal, harmonized Volkstruktur of which Germans were felt to have 
been robbed by the exteriorizing, individuating tendencies of bourgeois-Semitic mass culture 
[...]. cultural activity could no longer proceed in the decentered unorganized way that served 
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Jewish and capitalistic interests. Rather, for Hitler, Nazism had to focus single-mindedly on 
the necessity of cultivating an integrated Volk consciousness among the masses. 
The Russian Runs movement shares the Nazis’ (but also the Soviets’) disapproval of 
cosmopolitanism and concern about the loss of nationhood and posit the existence of a 
conspiracy to rid Russians of their national consciousness: “The Russian nation has long 
faced extermination, and our enemies are making short work of it: they have divided us, 
turned us into drunkards [...] and turned us into a nation-less herd of sheep [...] who poison 
themselves with alcohol, cigarettes, and other drugs” (Russkie probezhki Petrozavodsk 2015, 
June 16). Many of the posts in the group pejoratively refer to Russians who drink, smoke, 
are physically inactive or do not have a strong sense of national identity as “rootless 
Russians” [“bezrodnye rossiiane”], the word “rossiiane” referring to the civic Russian nation 
as opposed to the ethnic Russian (russkij) nation. The word “rootless” is notable because of 
its widespread usage during the Stalin era to refer to those who were perceived as 
inadequately loyal to the Soviet Union; the term “rootless cosmopolitans” had distinctly anti-
Semitic connotations (Gelbin 2016). The war against Russian national consciousness is 
thought to be waged primarily by the state, which unfairly labels the “healthy nationalism” 
of the Russian Runs as extremism and those who refuse to fall in line with the state’s 
biopolitical strategy as extremists. 
The imperial ethnic nationalist strategy’s antipathy towards the state, its distinct 
practices, and its hardline position on the question of nationhood should not obscure its 
similarities with the other strategies that have so far been discussed. One major similarity 
with both the official strategy and the teetotaler strategy is its concern about an influx of 
non-Russian values and their role in promoting unhealthy behavior. In particular, it 
reproduces the teetotalers’ discourse of a disembodied, atemporal enemy working tirelessly 
to corrupt Russian minds: “there is a war going on, an information war, in which the people 
will become so indoctrinated that they destroy themselves. We are being injected with false 
values and a false culture. At every step, there is booze and cigarettes — legal drugs” 
(Russkie probezhki Petrozavodsk 2014, May 12). Sobriety and physical activity are praised 
as traditional Russian values that have become alien to Russian society as a result of the 
onslaught of foreign, consumerist values and mass culture. As in the teetotaler discourse, the 
idea that one can consume alcohol moderately is condemned as a dangerous myth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
consciously promoted by the media and hostile foreign actors in order to get Russians 
drinking.  
Moreover, as was the case with the teetotalers, it is at times unclear whether the 
ethnic nationalists prioritize structure or agency in defining individual conduct and creating 
subjectivities. On one hand, people who smoke and drink are often portrayed as morally 
inferior and beyond salvation: “Most people are supporters of the destruction and 
degradation of the country — drop by a night club or any other such ‘upstanding’ 
establishment and you’ll see a huge herd of reprobates and rossiiantsy [a pejorative term for 
Russians who embrace a civic Russian identity]” (Russkie probezhki Petrozavdosk 2014, 
February 3). Self-improvement is portrayed entirely as a matter of choice and individual will 
power, and self-discipline is seen as the ultimate virtue. On the other hand, as previously 
mentioned, the Russian Runs wholly embrace the conspiratorial discourse according to 
which Russians who do not lead healthy lifestyles are the victims of information warfare and 
must be woken up to the fact that they are being manipulated. “Don’t finance your own 
suicide! Do sports, read books, think with your own head! […] We won’t let those parasites 
destroy us!” (Russkie probezhki 2016, November 17). A large portion of the content on the 
Russian Runs pages is made up of reposts of Vladimir Zhdanov’s lectures and videos 
produced by Common Cause about the dominance of foreign companies on the Russian 
alcohol and tobacco markets, a global cabal determined to flood Russia with illegal 
narcotics, and other topics.   
In addition, despite the Russian Runs’ general aversion to the state, “which tries to 
scare us with all its laws” (Russkie probezhki Petrozavodsk 2016, July 11), and its criticism 
of Vladimir Putin specifically, they believe in the necessity of a strong, enlightened state 
capable of mandating self-discipline and individual morality. A post from the Samara group, 
for example, includes a lengthy quote from Stalin about the imperative of a government 
takeover of alcohol production as a prelude to the closure of all alcohol plants (Russkie 
probezhki za ZOZh Samara 2012, May 31). Other posts discuss the need for a greater state 
presence in the promotion of sports and physical activity. Russian Run participants also 
directly enforce other aspects of the state’s biopolitical strategy, as illustrated by a 2013 post 
from Krasnodar instructing followers to attack local residents who planned to gather in the 
city’s center to protest the cancellation of a concert by gay British performer Elton John: 
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“Let’s help these perverts understand the wickedness of their behavior and explain to them 
what the law says about gay propaganda!” (Russkie probezhki Krasnodar 2013, July 9).  
As with the other strategies, the ethnic nationalist strategy is partially built upon a 
glorification of Russia’s heroic past, and self-improvement is framed as a matter of honoring 
the greatness of one’s ancestors. The Russian Runs are particularly active around May 9 
(“Victory Day”), the date on which Russians commemorate the Soviet victory over Nazi 
Germany. In offline demonstrations and on social media, the movement encourages people 
to celebrate the holiday without drinking, because “your forefathers fought for Russia’s life 
and for your freedom, not for an alcoholic genocide!” (Russkie Probezhki za ZOZh Samara 
2017, May 8). The “information war” is framed as a continuation of Hitler’s campaign to 
bring Russia to its knees. Similar to the other strategies, the ethnic nationalists take the idea 
of Great Power Russia as a point of departure; one of the most common slogans on the 
Russian Runs’ VKontakte pages is “Only a Sober Russia Will Be Great!”  
A further point of overlap between the ethnic nationalist strategy and that of the 
teetotalers is its concern with genetics and the importance of genetic purity; however, while 
the teetotaler strategy draws heavily on medical and scientific knowledges and concentrates 
on alcohol, tobacco, and cigarettes, that of the ethnic nationalists is more underpinned by the 
discourse of racial hygiene. Intimate relations with non-Russians are considered as 
unhygienic as the consumption of alcohol: “In simple terms, the first man you were sexually 
involved with, the first man you slept with, is to be considered the father of all of your 
children. If that man was unhealthy, a criminal, a drunkard, mentally ill, or non-Russian, that 
will have a big effect on your children” (Russkie probezhki 2011). This serves as a bridge to 
the broader theme of anxiety about the dissolution of gender roles and proper gender 
conduct, which was also found in the other strategies. Women are instructed not to drink not 
only because “the health of future generations of our children rides on the health of the 
mother” (Russkie probezhki Petrozavdosk 2016, March 7) but also because drinking leads to 
sexual promiscuity and runs counter to women’s naturally gentle nature. Alcohol is also said 
to result in the feminization of men and the masculinization of women (Russkie probezhki 
2011). Men are called to work on themselves and build strength in the name of fulfilling the 
role of warrior and defender of the family, the nation, and the Motherland.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
In conclusion, despite the imperial ethnic nationalists’ opposition to the state and 
their preoccupation with the question of the Russian nation, their biopolitical strategy 
contains many of the same discursive elements as the official strategy, echoing Foucault’s 
ideas about the heterogeneity of power relations and the contextuality of practices of 
resistance/technologies of the self. The imperial ethnic nationalists draw upon the same 
discursive and symbolic reservoir as the state to advocate for the creation of new Russian 
subjects, and they contest vertical power relations and coercive state practices while at the 
same time reinforcing them. This fact demonstrates the strength of conceiving of radical 
Russian nationalist movements as counter-conducts that inform and are informed by a 
broader discursive milieu rather than simply as sources of opposition to the state.  
 
4.4. Killing the State Inside Yourself: The Straight Edge Strategy 
The Straight Edge movement (colloquially known as sXe) was born out of the early 1980s 
punk scene on the American East Coast as a response to the “nihilistic tendencies, including 
drug and alcohol abuse, casual sex, violence, and self-destructive ‘live fast, die young’ 
attitudes” that prevailed in that subculture (Haenfler 2006, p. 8). Its essential tenets are total 
abstention from the use of drugs, alcohol, and tobacco and a commitment to avoid casual 
sex, but different branches are influenced by different subcultures and different contextual 
factors (ibid.). For example, while many Straight Edge groups in the United States champion 
the causes of social justice and anti-racism (ibid., p. 40), the Russian scene is distinct 
because of its domination by white nationalists and neo-Nazis (Shekhovtsov 2013, p. 287). 
Such groups began to face particularly harsh repression by the Russian state in 2014; many 
fled to Ukraine to fight on the side of the Ukrainian government (Yudina 2015). 
To understand the Russian Straight Edge strategy for the body, I analyzed content in 
two groups on VKontakte: Fine Line [Chyotkaya gran’] and Iron Rus [Zheleznaya Rus’]. 
These are the largest and most active Straight Edge communities on VKontakte, with 
respectively over 7,000 and over 12,000 members at the time of writing. While the nature of 
the group is necessarily cryptic, Fine Line seems to be an umbrella organization coordinating 
various offline Straight Edge communities across Russia in addition to serving as a 
discussion board; Iron Rus is dedicated to the online discussion of the Straight Edge 
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lifestyle. The latter community describes the Russian Straight Edge scene as follows: “nssxe 
(national socialism streight [sic] edge) is a subgroup of neo-Nazis who believe that drinking 
and smoking are below the dignity of the white race. There are thousands of them, and it just 
so happened historically that almost all Straight Edgers in Russia are nationalists and neo-
Nazis (nationalism + sxe = nssxe)” (Zheleznaya Rus’ 2016, May 14). While they profess 
solidarity with the white race in general, they represent Russia as potentially one of the last 
bastions of “true” European values and lament the idea that the white West has been 
destroyed by multiculturalism and tolerance, a sentiment which is widespread in broader 
Russian society (Morozov 2015).  
Out of necessity, the Russian Straight Edge community keeps a low profile and 
employs different forms of visibility than followers of other strategies. The Fine Line’s page 
contains many photographs of the offline activities of Straight Edgers in various cities; 
however, the participants’ faces are always pixelated, betraying the group’s wariness about 
the possibility of detection by the state. Russian Straight Edgers do not share the Russian 
Runs’ sense of messianism; rather than promoting their strategy by appearing on the streets 
in large numbers, they place pro-Straight Edge signs in public spaces and on the storefronts 
of businesses that sell alcohol or tobacco. Other Straight Edge activities consist mainly of 
weapons trainings and workout sessions that take place out of the public eye, either in gyms 
or in the forest; a common slogan repeated on both pages is “the forest and the gym are our 
chapels!” (Chyotkaya gran’ 2018, February 4). While the imperial ethnic nationalists seemed 
to view the forest primarily as a place to avoid the police, the Straight Edgers’ reading of the 
forest is explicitly rooted in a Russian neo-pagan religious movement known as 
Rodnoveriye, which glorifies nature and sees the human body as an inseparable part of it. 
Interest in paganism began to grow in Russia in the early 1990s and has almost always been 
accompanied by fascist ideologies (Shenfield 2001, pp. 248-249). Russian Straight Edgers 
view the forest as a sacred site of bodily transcendence and transformation. “For the pagan, 
person and nature are one in the same. For the pagan, each form of nature is the will of one 
of the gods” (Zheleznaya Rus’ 2016, January 6).   
The Straight Edgers’ adoption of a pagan view on nature and the body is linked to the 
imperatives of reviving Russian traditions, awakening Russian national consciousness, and 
living up to the great deeds of one’s ancestors. Unlike the other strategies, however, the 
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Straight Edgers’ historical reference point for Russian greatness is the pre-Christian era: 
“More and more, paganism is gaining currency among healthy, active youth, taking the place 
of Soviet atheism/indifference [pofigizm] and crowding out rotten Jew-Christianity [...]. 
Paganism is a worldview that we inherit along with our blood. The revival of our ancestors’ 
faith is in full swing” (Zheleznaya Rus’ 2015, August 21). The primary subjects of heroism 
and virtue are ancient figures such as Oleg of Novgorod, as opposed to Soviet war veterans. 
Regardless of the references to pre-Christian Russia and the disdain of the Soviet experience, 
the basic structure of thought is the same in the Straight Edge strategy as in the others; 
namely, the idea that reviving forgotten subjectivities is the key to returning Russia to an 
imagined glorious past. The Straight Edgers also condemn the notion that drinking is a 
Russian tradition: “People who say, ‘But Russians have always been drinkers!’ are spreading 
total nonsense! That’s not the case and people who say those things simply don’t know their 
own history” (Zheleznaya Rus’ 2017, August 18). Moreover, they too decry what they see as 
an onslaught of liberal, consumerist values, which are thought to be forced upon Russia by a 
cabal of globalists. The Straight Edgers thus share the conspiratorial worldview of other 
strategies. They assert that a genocide is being carried out against the Russian people, that 
traditional Russian values have been perverted by information warfare, and that the Russian 
government is colluding with alcohol and tobacco companies to rake in more money at the 
expense of the health of the nation. They reproduce the discourse of “alcohol and narcotic 
terrorism” that is buttressed by “the propaganda of false freedom” (Chyotkaya gran’ 2018, 
February 22). The concern about a genocide against the Russian people is nested within 
greater anxieties about a putative worldwide genocide of the white race.  
These conspiratorial ideas that deprive Russians of their agency throw into 
particularly sharp relief the Straight Edgers’ emphasis on individual discipline, which is 
more prominent than in the other strategies. A large number of the posts in both 
communities are devoted to the topic of self-discipline, which is promoted using positive, 
motivational messages that distinctly resemble the American discourse (Gabowitsch 2016) 
of individual self-betterment: “The cultivation of an internal sense of discipline is the task of 
anyone who wants to be successful [...] You’re capable of more!” (Chyotkaya gran’ 2018, 
February 14). Many of these posts are accompanied by lists of healthy habits that one should 
pursue in order to be successful, such as exercising in the morning, sleeping for eight hours 
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each night, and drinking sufficient amounts of water, advice which comes from the 
international “common sense” about healthy living and draws upon medical discourses. The 
restoration of government over the self is linked in with the Russian Straight Edgers’ pagan 
worldview, as illustrated by a poem posted in the Fine Line group: “By the millions, the 
media / proposes us new models for enslavement / pack your backpack, we’re headed to the 
forest / to kill the State inside ourselves” (Chyotkaya gran’ 2018, March 1).  
These positive messages of self-improvement and self-liberation, however, are 
confounded by the Straight Edgers’ violent rhetoric about the moral and biological 
inferiority of people who do not lead healthy lifestyles, who are depicted as worthless and 
beyond salvation:  
The more you look at modern society [...] the less interest you have in participating in the 
“war for the health of the nation”. What’s the point? What war? Demonstrative runs around 
the city and pull-up competitions? That’s the same as trying to reanimate a zombie. But 
we’re no voodoo shamans — we’re the cleansers [chistil’shchiki] [...] I want everyone who 
destroys their body to get it over with quickly and effectively. I want the Untermensch to go 
from drinking one or two beers a day to drinking moonshine [...] I want to witness your 
suicide. (Chyotkaya gran’ 2016, October 20).  
People who drink, smoke, and use drugs are also portrayed as traitors of the Russian nation 
and the white race. “They are killing OUR future. Weak people, weak souls, weak wills. 
Worthless, spineless hunks of flesh who are incapable of further development. They’re dead 
weight. And dead weight must be gotten rid of” (Chyotkaya gran’ 2016, January 29). Thus, 
for the Straight Edgers, the health of the nation is not so much a matter of laws or state 
intervention as it is a question that will eventually be resolved by natural selection.  
As in the other strategies, women who consume alcohol or smoke are considered to 
be particularly inferior, although this is expressed much more aggressively by the Straight 
Edgers: one image that appears frequently in both groups depicts the silhouette of a man 
holding an axe and standing above a cowering woman, with the caption “good night 
smoking girl” (Chyotkaya gran’ 2016, February 23). Women who engage in these behaviors, 
as well as women who choose not to have children, are portrayed as race traitors and denied 
any legitimacy as female subjects: they are “not women, but bio-waste [biomusor] and 
parasites” (Chyotkaya gran’ 2016, June 12). At the same time, alcohol and tobacco 
marketers are blamed for tricking women into smoking and drinking. The man in the 
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Straight Edge strategy plays a similar role as in other strategies: he is a warrior and a 
protector who fears nothing, and he is not afraid to kill in order to defend his honor, his land, 
or his family. Alcohol and other substances are represented as contrary to the nature of men: 
“Alcohol and drugs drain the man of his essence - they make him tolerant, apathetic, soft, 
and unable to defend his land, his family, or even himself” (Zheleznaya rus’ 2016, April 7). 
While the Straight Edgers employ rhetoric that is at times violent, reject the Soviet 
experience, and embrace paganism, a deeper look reveals that many of the core tenets of its 
biopolitical agenda can be found in slightly different forms in other strategies. They share 
the same anxieties as other groups about the continued existence of the Russian people and 
the dilution of its gene pool, the erosion of gender roles, and the inability of “traditional 
Russian values” to withstand the onslaught of tolerant foreign values. They look back at 
Russia’s past with longing and use it as a basis for the construction of new norms. This brief 
exploration of the Russian Straight Edge community demonstrates again that even the most 
extreme forms of resistance do not necessarily entail a wholesale rejection of hegemonic 
discourses and may indeed serve to reproduce certain aspects of them.  
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5. Discussion and Conclusions 
This study revealed several prevalent themes across the sample of healthy lifestyle 
promotion strategies in Russia. For one thing, each strategy attributes Russians’ embrace of 
unhealthy habits at least partially to the influence of “non-Russian” values. The promotion of 
healthy lifestyle practices is viewed as a key element of the revival of a traditional Russian 
subjectivity that has been obscured by consumerism and foreign mass culture. Each strategy 
to a greater or lesser extent advances the idea of a conspiracy to relax Russians’ attitudes 
towards drugs, tobacco, and alcohol by distorting their values. While this discursive element 
is present in the official strategy, it is a central theme of the alternative strategies under 
analysis, which represent the practice of a healthy lifestyle as a subversive way of 
“reclaiming” one’s Russian-ness. The official strategy, the teetotalers and the imperial ethnic 
nationalists all envision a strong and enlightened state capable of enforcing certain types of 
conduct and protecting Russians from immoral thoughts and behaviors, even while the latter 
also resent what they perceive as the state’s restriction of self-expression. However, this 
emphasis on structure and laws is sometimes accompanied by a contrasting emphasis on 
agency and self-discipline. The uptake of healthy lifestyle practices is often viewed as a 
question of individual resolve and morality; the discourses of constant self-improvement and 
full responsibility for one’s own actions can be found in each of the strategies, and 
particularly in the imperial ethnic nationalist and Straight Edge strategies, an individual’s 
inability to exercise total self-government is interpreted as a sign of moral inferiority. 
Each of the strategies also seeks to influence Russians’ bodily conduct by referencing 
the country’s glorious past. They stress the importance of honoring the country’s history and 
living up to the deeds of one’s heroic ancestors by transforming one’s behavior. These 
heroes and heroic events are drawn primarily from the Soviet period, with the Great Patriotic 
War in particular serving as a potent reservoir of affective resources that are leveraged by 
various actors to convince Russians to lead healthy lifestyles and practice greater self-
surveillance. The Straight Edgers also take Russia’s glorious past as a given while locating 
that glory in a different era and recoding it to fit in with their neo-pagan worldview. 
Another prominent theme running through each of the strategies is anxiety about the 
survival of the Russian nation and the Russian state. In each case, the states and the nation 
are viewed as natural entities whose vitality is reducible to the vitality of individual members 
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of the population, and the promotion of individual self-improvement is linked to the 
objective of reviving the people’s collective economic, demographic, and spiritual well-
being. Each strategy takes as a given the idea that the Russian people – ethnic, civic, or 
something in between – is under threat or in decline, and the promotion of healthy lifestyles 
is meant to reverse these trends. Thus, while certain groups view themselves as resisting the 
state’s authority (such as the imperial ethnic nationalists and the Straight Edgers), some of 
their activities, at least in the area of healthy lifestyle promotion, are nonetheless in line with 
the state’s mission of putting an end to the demographic crisis. 
Each of the healthy lifestyle promotion strategies is heavily gendered, and concern 
about the survival of the Russian people is bound up with an anxiety about the erosion of 
traditional Russian gender roles. Women are instructed to lead healthy lifestyles not only to 
ensure the health of their children and future generations of Russians, but also to maintain 
their femininity and provide a contrast to the Russian male subject, who is represented as a 
strong, fearless defender of his lands and his people. Women are expected to practice healthy 
lifestyles in the context of a panoptic male gaze that continually monitors their performance 
of femininity. The reaffirmation of these gender norms throughout each of the strategies is 
again in line with the state’s efforts to unite the Russian citizenry around “traditional” 
Russian values and to “counterdistinguish a ‘de-masculinized and pacified Europe’ from 
Russia, which remains ‘the masculine country’” (Makarychev & Yatsyk 2015, p. 147). 
Several theoretical implications can be drawn from this study. The first is that power, 
understood as any “attempt to direct, control, or determine the conduct of others” (Allen 
2013, p. 344), rather than simply being wielded from above and resisted from below, is also 
exercised by different groups within society. Each of these groups has its own notions about 
proper conduct and coherent strategies for the establishment of new behavioral norms that 
use a variety of discursive practices and performances. Moreover, the power exercised 
through these groups does not have to be physically coercive or violent. It can work by 
generating the desire to modify one’s behavior in accordance with certain ideals or 
objectives rather than by punishing. It can discipline by encouraging individuals to exercise 
constant self-surveillance in order to live up to certain norms. Despite the absence of 
physical violence, the imposition of “micro-penalties” (Markula & Pringle 2006, p. 44) in 
the form of the shame or social ostracism that one may experience when deviating from a 
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norm can be considered symbolically repressive. While power in the Foucauldian sense is 
exercised constantly at all levels of society, any one individual or group’s real ability to 
establish new norms of conduct may be conditioned by material and institutional factors. In 
stressing that power is everywhere and comes from everywhere, Foucault is charged with 
“ignoring the structural power imbalances in society” (Pylypa 1998, p. 35). This criticism is 
particularly pertinent for illiberal societies, in which real political participation and 
opportunities for collective action may be limited. Therefore, in the absence of changes in 
the structure of Russian society, the alternative healthy lifestyle promotion strategies likely 
have little hope of actually becoming institutionalized in the immediate future. 
Nonetheless, Foucault’s ideas about power relations provide a useful background 
against which to analyze the substance of these strategies. He emphasized that in any power 
strategy, “a multiplicity of discursive elements […] can come into play,” sometimes in 
contradictory ways (Foucault 1978, p. 100). Death (2016) used Foucault’s insights about 
counter-conducts to show how these contradictions may unintentionally lead to the 
solidification of existing power relations. Accordingly, I demonstrated how the imperial 
ethnic strategy combines two seemingly incompatible elements: namely, hostility towards 
the state, which it sees as repressive and overly controlling, and a push for more state 
intervention into the conduct of Russian citizens. I also showed how both of the oppositional 
strategies reproduce certain elements of the official discourse and may ultimately only help 
the state achieve its objectives in the area of healthy lifestyle promotion as well as in its 
broader agenda of “biopolitical conservatism” (Makarychev & Yatsyk 2015). The 
Foucauldian idea of mutable and dynamic power relations also sheds light on how different 
power strategies confront one another, sometimes appropriating and recoding certain 
discursive elements. Thus, for example, the conspiracy to undermine the Russian state and 
civic nation present in the official and teetotaler strategies is recoded into a conspiracy to 
wipe out the ethnic Russian nation or re-embedded into a broader narrative about global 
white genocide. 
            The application of Foucault’s and Death’s counter-conduct perspective enhanced the 
analysis in several ways. In focusing on different groups’ actual ideas about proper conduct 
rather than stated opposition to or approval of the existing power structure, it allowed for the 
inclusion of the teetotaler strategy, which contests the hegemonic discourse about healthy 
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lifestyles without challenging the overall legitimacy of the state. It enabled an analysis of the 
other two strategies that focused on how their practitioners seek to be governed and towards 
what ends rather than placing too much emphasis on their opposition to the state per se, 
which made visible some of the similarities between these strategies and the official strategy. 
This made it possible to destabilize the conventional binary between “compliance” and 
“resistance” also challenged by Death (2016), showing that neither is necessarily absolute; 
resistance may be coupled with an acceptance of certain elements of hegemonic discourses, 
and compliance may contain subversive elements that challenge those discourses. These 
observations will hopefully allow this study to contribute to the growing body of literature 
on contestation and political activism that has sought to introduce nuance by challenging the 
strict pro-/anti-Kremlin binary that informs many analyses of state-society relations in 
Russia (e.g., Cheskin & March 2015; Bindman 2015; Åberg 2015).  
            This limitations of this study should be acknowledged. First, it analyzes each of the 
healthy lifestyle promotion strategies separately and over a large period of time. A more 
rigorous chronological analysis could shed light on how and when particular discursive 
elements entered and exited each of the strategies and how these transformations were 
conditioned by broader contextual factors. As mentioned previously, it is also limited by its 
non-inclusion of strategies that promote healthy lifestyles without making explicit reference 
to patriotism or national belonging. This exclusive focus on such discourses might make the 
study’s conclusions less innovative; for example, it is perhaps not surprising that such 
ideologically traditionalist groups would advocate for traditional gender roles, and one could 
reasonably argue that a certain confirmation bias is present. A lengthier study could 
investigate a broader sample of healthy lifestyle promotion strategies. Finally, a discussion 
of the discourse surrounding events such as the Russian Olympic doping scandal, the 2018 
FIFA World Cup, and competitive sports more broadly would surely have enriched the 
analysis of the official strategy but was omitted for the sake of space.  
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